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Abstract
The twentieth century ended with the vindication of many of its most mistreated victims' cries for reparation.2
Holocaust survivors retrieved over $8 billion in assets frozen in bank accounts or looted by the Nazis;3
Japanese Americans interned during World War II received compensation from the U.S. government;4 Chile
compensated descendants of Pinochet's victims;5 Japan redressed Korean "comfort women"; 6 and Canada
paid damages to Aboriginals for forced assimilation of their children.7 Absent from the list was the longest
suffering and most visible of groups seeking repair - African Americans.8
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Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving
the Case for Reparations
Amy J. Sepinwall*
I. INTRODUCTION
"We will have to repent ... not only for the vitriolic words and actions
of the bad people, but for the appalling silence of the good people."'
The twentieth century ended with the vindication of many of its most
mistreated victims' cries for reparation.2 Holocaust survivors retrieved
over $8 billion in assets frozen in bank accounts or looted by the Nazis;3
Japanese Americans interned during World War II received compensation
from the U.S. government;4 Chile compensated descendants of Pinochet's
victims;' Japan redressed Korean "comfort women"; 6 and Canada paid
damages to Aboriginals for forced assimilation of their children.7 Absent
from the list was the longest suffering and most visible of groups seeking
repair - African Americans.
" B.A., M.A. McGill University; J.D. Yale; Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Georgetown University.
The author wishes to thank Bruce Ackerman, Alisa Carse, Owen Fiss, Tanya Hemandez, Alvin
Klevorick, Maggie Little, David Luban, Peter Schuck, Marc Spindelman, Andy Siegel, and Robin
West, all of whom offered extensive comments and encouragement. Versions of this paper were
presented at the Yale Law Women Works-in-Progress series and the 2006 annual meeting of the Law
and Society Association where participants provided helpful feedback. The author claims full
responsibility for any remaining errors.
'Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in REVOLUTION AND THE RULE OF
LAw 12, 21 (Edward Kent ed., 1971).
2 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 696-98 (2003) (presenting a very helpful overview of reparations
movements in table form); Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African Americans, 41 How. L.J.
479, 480 (1998).
3 STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR 11 (2003).
4 Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified at 50 App. U.S.C. §
1989b-1); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American
Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998).
5 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 696 n. 22.
6 George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH 113, 124
(Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
7 Pamela O'Connor, Squaring the Circle: How Canada Is Dealing with the Legacy ofIts Indian
Residential Schools Experiment, 28 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 232, 251 (2000).
8 Opponents of reparations often argue that repair has already been conferred through the pledge of
forty acres and a mule, the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, or the promise of affirmative
action. The promise of forty acres and a mule was largely apocryphal. Special Field Order No. 15 did
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Embarrassed by the satisfaction of these other victims' claims,
opponents of Black reparations are left to find a legitimate ground upon
which to distinguish the claims of contemporary African Americans. To
this end, they construe the 140-year-long failure to offer repair not as the
egregiously lengthy omission that it is, but instead as the feature that would
render moot any entitlement to redress. 9 Thus, the common rejoinder to
pleas for Black reparations has opponents protesting that they never owned
slaves, and so they should not be made to pay for those who did. 10
state that land would be allotted for settlement by the freed Blacks, with forty acres the maximum lot
size per family. The word "mule" never appears in the Field Order, nor does any other language
suggesting that the freedmen would receive materials to assist them in cultivating the land. The Field
Order was effectively rescinded by President Andrew Johnson, who returned the land to confederate
soldiers in an attempt at national reconciliation. See, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, Focusing the Reparations
Debate Beyond 1865, 69 TENN. L. REV. 653, 654 n.8 (2002). The Reconstruction Amendments have
been undermined, if not entirely eviscerated, by judicial opinions that largely robbed them of their
transformative potential. See, e.g., Benno C. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court
and Race in the Progressive Era, Part I: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 461-72
(1982). And affirmative action has assisted white women and wealthy minority members more than
poor Blacks. See, e.g., Suzanne Fields, An Attempt to Buy Racial Justice Cheap: Many blacks, women
see affirmative action as a psychological obstacle, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 13, 1995, at 6A
(describing "white women" as "the biggest beneficiaries of affirmative action"); Tung Yin, A Crabolic
Some Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative Action, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 226 (1997)
(reviewing RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1996)) (describing Kahlenberg's view that class-based affirmative action would be superior to race-
based affirmative action because the latter "currently benefits affluent Blacks" while leaving the most
disadvantaged African Americans in poverty).
Indeed, the irony appears to be that the success of some of these other reparations movements
derives at least partially from the as-yet-unsuccessful African American reparationist platform. Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., Addressing the Racial Divide: Reparations, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 115, 118
(2004). And, the failure to offer reparations to Black slaves appears downright perverse in light of the
fact that some slave owners were compensated by Congress when their slaves were freed! See Alfred
L. Brophy, The World of Reparations: Slavery Reparations in Historical Perspective, 3 J.L. SOC'Y
105, 109 (2002).
For historical descriptions of the Black reparations movement dating back to Emancipation, see
Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to African Americans, 29 S.U. L. REV. 25,
29-33 (2001). The movement has not been entirely without success. State legislatures in Louisiana
and California, as well as city councils in D.C., Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, and Nashville, have all
passed resolutions in support of reparations. See generally Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Comment, The
Development of the Movement for Reparations for African Descendants, 3 J.L. SOC'Y 133, 139 (2002).
Nonetheless, none of these resolutions has yielded a program of repair. Moreover, since the harm for
which repair is owed is waged at the national level, as I argue infra Part IV, it is national action that is
called for.
9 See generally Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657,
1688-90 (1999) (arguing that Black reparations have not been forthcoming because of the relatively
large number of African American slave descendants, the long passage of time since slavery, the
existence of affirmative action and other programs that might be seen as substitutes for reparations, and
the dispersed character of slave descendants).
1o Perhaps most famously, Rep. Henry Hyde, R.-Ill., has insisted, "I never owned a slave. I never
oppressed anybody. I don't know that I should have to pay for someone who did [own slaves]
generations before I was born." Jeffrey Ghannam, Repairing the Past, 86 A.B.A. J. 39 (2000). See
also Charles J. Ogletree, The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2003)
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Besides, they continue, the slaves are long dead and the effects of slavery
now nonexistent,1 so there would not be anyone who could legitimately
claim compensation anyway. 
2
The opposition to Black reparations thus focuses on the temporal
dislocation between slavery and the present, but the argument loses none of
its force when applied to more recent injustices. After all, "righteous
gentiles" in Germany did not exterminate Jews; 13 most Japanese never
availed themselves of the "comfort" of Korean prostitutes;' 4 and many
Chileans ardently resisted Pinochet's rule. 15 If opponents of Black
(citing this objection to Black reparations); Jack E. White, Don't Waste Your Breath: The Fight for
Slave Reparations Is a Morally Just but Totally Hopeless Cause, TIME, Apr. 2, 2001, at 48 ("[N]o
matter how strong our arguments are, we'll never get white folks to pay up. Most white Americans are
descended from people who immigrated here after the Civil War, so they feel no need to atone."). See
generally Joe R. Feagin & Eileen O'Brien, The Growing Movement for Reparations, in WHEN SORRY
ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 341, 343 (citing an ABC News Poll indicating that 88 percent of white
respondents rejected the notion of paying reparations).
Other opponents of Black reparations argue that, given the length of time that has elapsed since
abolition, any legitimate claim that would have existed then would have attenuated now. E.g., Charles
Fried, Remarks at the Yale, New Haven and American Slavery Conference: The Moral Claims of the
Past: Justice Across Time (Sept. 28, 2002).
Some African Americans have also rejected the idea of reparations, although not because they
believe that the claims are empty or moot. Instead, they worry about the stigmatizing effect of a
reparations program, e.g., John McWhorter, Against Reparations: Why African Americans Can Believe
in America, NEW REPUB., July 23, 2001, at 32, or they deny that such a program could ever expiate the
moral transgression, e.g., Bayard Rustin, The Failure of Black Separatism, HARPERS, Jan. 1970, at 25,
31 ("It is insulting to Negroes to offer them reparation for past generations of suffering, as if the
balance of an irreparable past could be set straight with a handout.").
" According to one study, the economic effects of slavery disappeared two generations after
abolition. Bruce Sacerdote, Slavery and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital (Sept.
10, 2002), http://www.dartmouth.edu/-bsacerdo/wpapers/Slavery3.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
Nonetheless, significant disparities in wealth remain between Blacks and Whites. See infra note 148.
12 See, e.g., Chad W. Bryan, Precedent and Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for
Redress and Where Awarding Reparations for Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REv. 599, 610-11 (2003)
(arguing that the supposed precedents for reparations for slavery-compensation packages for interned
Japanese-Americans and the victims of the Rosewood massacre-are in fact disanalogous insofar as
these other programs awarded compensation only to the victims themselves or to their first-degree
relatives).
13 Indeed, a proclamation issued by the district governor of Warsaw declared that anyone who
"deliberately offers refuge to such Jews or who aids them in any other manner" would be punished with
death. Dr. Ludwig Fischer, The Penalty for Helping a Jew in Occupied Poland (Nov. 10, 1941),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shtetl/righteous/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). Yet
Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority in Israel, acknowledges
21,310 non-Jews who risked their lives to help Jews escape the Nazis. See Yad Vashem, The
Righteous Among the Nations, http://wwwl.yadvashem.org/righteous/index-righteous.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2006).
14 These women serviced members of the Japanese military, and so would not have been available
to most civilians. See BBC News, Korean Comfort Women Compensated, Mar. 29, 1998, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/despatches/71239.stm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
15 See, e.g., Pamela Constable, Thousands in Chile Celebrate Vote to End Pinochet's Rule, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1988, at 1.
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reparations are correct to insist that an individual may be held responsible,
and hence liable, only for transgressions in which he participated directly,
then none of these reparations programs is justifiable.
Supporters of Black reparations, or "reparationists," 16 have largely
remained silent in the face of this challenge to their campaign.17 Instead,
the recent reparations literature is rife with internal debates regarding
whether legal claims should be framed in the language of compensation or
restitution; i" whether they should be pursued as matters of public or private
law; 19 whether the legal claims can withstand procedural barriers like
statutes of limitations 20 and standing requirements; 21 whether the harm to
be repaired is that of slavery itself or subsequent acts of racial
discrimination; 22 whether reparations should be premised upon distributive
16 See, eg., Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk. Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law
Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 85 (2004).
17 See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 70 n. 14 (2005) (listing some thirty recent articles
or books on Black reparations); cf Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations Litigation Through
the Eyes of the Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 457, 458-63 (2003) (presenting a history of
the Black reparations movement); Christopher C. Jones, Redemption Song: An Analysis of the
Reparations Movement, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 449,451-54 (2003) (same).
1s See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, Segregation, and Contemporary
Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for African Americans, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49
(2004) (offering an account of the harms of slavery that incorporates both the physical and
psychological costs of being enslaved, which would ground a claim for compensation, as well as the
unjust enrichment of slaveholders, which would ground a claim for restitution). Compare Anthony J.
Sebok, Two Concepts oflnjustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405 (2004) (defending a
compensatory justice model), and Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 1443 (2004) (same), with Bernard Boxill, Morality of Reparation, 2 J. Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
113, 120 (1972) (defending the paradigm of unjust enrichment), and Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and
Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 1139 (2004) (same).
19 See, e.g., Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social Responsibility and African American Reparations:
Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (2003); Christopher A. Bracey, Thinking Race, Making Nation, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 911 (2003) (reviewing GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY
(2002)); cf Brophy, supra note 16, at 130-35 (advocating the use of tort law not as an end in itself but
instead as a useful vehicle for framing discussions about moral culpability).
20 Compare Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1183
(referring to the statute of limitations issue as an "impregnable" barrier to reparations suits) with Roy L.
Brooks, The Slave Redress Cases, 27 N.C. CENT. L.J. 130, 175-77 (2005) (advancing strategies for
overcoming statutes of limitation issues), and Malveaux, supra note 17, at 122 (arguing that statutes of
limitations ought not to foreclose suits seeking Black reparations).
21 Epstein, supra note 20 at 1179-81; Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in
Reparations Lawsuits, 20 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91 (2004).
22 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery,
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 497 (2003) (identifying some of the barriers for reparationists but
nonetheless advocating efforts seeking reparations for slavery and the legacy of Jim Crow). But cf
Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557
(2003) (arguing that reparationists should pursue their cause by seeking repair for lynchings, rather than
slavery itself); David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim
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or corrective conceptions of justice; 23 whether a reparations campaign
should seek to appeal to taxpayers' moral sense rather than their sense of
self-interest;24 whether the goal of reparations should be retribution rather
than reconciliation;25 whether reparationists should seek money or a more
symbolic form of repair; 26 whether a reparations program should be
mandated by government or instead voluntarily adopted by private
entities; 27 whether the nation has already repaid its debt to Blacks in the
Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (2004) (locating the basis for repair in Jim Crow laws rather than
slavery).
23 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31,
31 (2004) (contrasting a "social welfare" - i.e., distributive - and "doing justice" - i.e., corrective -
model for reparations); cf Lopez, supra note 8, at 665-72 (proposing a method to rank order our
corrective justice priorities, in light of scarcity, and arguing that this method militates against Black
reparations). Compare Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319 (2004)
(conceiving of reparations as a program of race-based wealth redistribution justified on distributive,
rather than corrective, justice grounds), with Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A
Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 685 (2004) (rooting
the duty to repair in society's obligation to remedy past discrimination).
24 Compare Robert A. Sedler, Claims for Reparations for Racism Undermine the Struggle for
Equality, 3 J.L. Soc'Y 119, 127-28 (2002) (arguing that racial equality can only be achieved by
appealing to Whites' sense of injustice), with Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The
Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 19-22 (2004) (adopting an interest convergence
theory in support of Black reparations), and Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African
American Reparations to Redirect America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689, 1707 (2002)
(suggesting that Whites could be made to support Black reparations if they came to believe that
Whites' interests would thereby be served).
25 Compare Jeffrey M. Brown, Deconstructing Babel: Toward a Theory of Structural Reparations,
56 RUTGERs L. REV. 463, 496 (2004) ("[T]he history of civil rights discourse suggests that linking the
idea of racial reconciliation to the reparations question is strategically unsound."), and Christopher
Kutz, Justice in Reparations: The Cost of Memory and the Value of Talk, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 277,
279 (2004) ("[T]he very fungibility of money means that giving it up hurts .... It is the infliction of
that hurt upon the donors that grounds the symbolic value of cash payment .... ) with Roy L. Brooks,
Getting Reparations for Slavery Right-A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
251, 254-56 (2004) (arguing that the goal of reparations ought to be forgiveness and atonement), and
David Hall, The Spirit of Reparations, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 3 (2004) (conceiving of Black
reparations as "a great opportunity" for the nation to undergo "spiritual cleansing").26 See, e.g., Troy Duster, Repairing the National Memory by Acknowledging the Living Presence of
'Our Childhood Locked in the Closet', 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 43, 45-47 (2004) (advocating a
program of Black reparations that would consist of memorial statues, truth commissions, and housing
reform); Lyons, supra note 22 at 1400-04 (proposing a National Rectification Project, which would
involve a material component, including efforts to reduce the Black-White income gap, and a moral
component, requiring symbolic acknowledgment of acts of past discrimination); cf Natsu Taylor Saito,
Beyond Reparations: Accommodating Wrongs or Honoring Resistance, 1 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 27, 41-41 (2003) (arguing that monetary reparations would reify an existing status quo that is itself
racist because monetary awards suggest that the harms they compensate are aberrations, whereas
slavery, on her account, is part and parcel of an inherently racist system).
27 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1291, 1317 (2004) (advancing
a hybrid public-private scheme that would enable individual taxpayers to contribute directly to a
reparations fund, with the government collecting the payments and offering partial tax credit as
inducement).
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form of affirmative action and welfare;28 whether a reparations program
can be implemented feasibly;29 and whether a reparations campaign will
indeed achieve reconciliation rather than racial division.3 °
Yet resolution of these issues, however thorny they are, will serve
neither to justify a program of Black reparations nor to sell it to the public
unless and until reparationists manage to provide an account of
responsibility that adequately responds to that of their opponents. I argue
here that none of the few attempts on this front has been or can be
successful.
31
These attempts respond to the individualist impulse animating anti-
reparationists' arguments by appealing to collectivist conceptions of
responsibility, 32 according to which responsibility attaches to the collective
first and foremost, and to its members only derivatively. 33 The
contestation about Black reparations thus reduces to a contest between
competing accounts of responsibility, as the individualist insistence that
"no one can be responsible, in the properly ethical sense, for the conduct of
28 Compare Bernard H. Siegan, The United States Has Already Apologized for Racial
Discrimination, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 413 (arguing that minority business
set-asides, along with school desegregation efforts, and other federal and state legislation, already
satisfy whatever debt the nation owed), with Albert Mosley, Affirmative Action as a Form of
Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 353, 355 (2003) (arguing that welfare and affirmative action, as
currently constituted, were neither designed as, nor function today as, forms of repair).
29 See, e.g., Peter Schuck, Slavery Reparations: A Misguided Movement, JURIST, Dec. 9, 2002,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew78.php (opposing reparations at least in part because no
reparations program could be implemented feasibly); see also Lyons, supra note 22, at 1403 (proposing
a detailed reparations program, but acknowledging that his proposal might well be "utopian"); Calvin
Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 157 (2004) (discussing both the practical problems with, as well as possible adverse consequences
of, Black reparations).
30 Cf Sedler, supra note 24, at 123 (maintaining that reparations will neither undo the disparate
treatment of Blacks nor appeal to the sense of injustice of Whites). Compare Brooks, supra note 25,
and Randall Robinson, What America Owes to Blacks and What Blacks Owe to Each Other, 6 AFR.-
AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (2004) ("[W]hen I talk about reparations, ... I am talking about the repair of
our general society. I am talking about the resuscitation of compassion."), with Robert W. Tracinski,
Comment, America's "Fields of the Blackbirds ": How the Campaign for Reparations for Slavery
Perpetuates Racism, 3 J.L. SoC'y 145, 156 (2002) (arguing that a group-based account of the harm for
which repair is owed "gives the lie to the claim that reparations would 'heal the wounds' of slavery and
racism. Reparations would do the opposite: they would promote a collectivist, racial concept of
justice."), and John H. McWhorter, The Reparations Racket: America Has Already Made Amends for
Slavery, CITY J., Mar. 29, 2002, http://www.city-joumal.org/html/eon3 29_02jm.html (calling
reparationists segregation "victimologists").
" See infra Part I.B.
32 See, e.g., JANNA THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATION AND
HISTORICAL INJUSTICE 12 (2002); George Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at
War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002); Seana Shiffrin, Reparations for
Slavery and Justice over Time (manuscript on file with the author).
33 See infra notes 60, 62-65 and accompanying text.
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another,", 34 collides with a collectivist ontology in which "[t]he 'we'
precedes the 'I.,'
35
Opponents of reparations already enjoy an advantage in this debate as
their arguments rely upon a conception of responsibility that American law
has made familiar to us. 36 On this conception, responsibility is limited to
the individual's contribution, and liability may be imposed on an
individual only for her actions, and only to the extent that these wrongfully
caused the injury to be redressed.37 Supporters of reparations are left to
defend their agendas with accounts of collective responsibility, which, in
their deviation from the law's individualism, have alternately been called
"barbarous",38 or "pervers[e].,, 39  Even supporters of ethical collectivism
acknowledge that it "has enjoyed few philosophically sophisticated
defenses" 0 and is "one of the murkiest and least explored topics in moral
philosophy."4 '
In fact, collective responsibility poses a problem for Black
reparationists not just because it is unpopular and under-theorized. The
accounts that do exist contemplate only contemporaneous injustices, 42 and
ask whether a member may be called to account for a harm the group
34 H.D. Lewis, The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility, in INDIVIDUAL AND
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE AT MY LAI 119, 121 (Peter A. French ed., 1972).
35 Heinrich Gomperz, Individual, Collective and Social Responsibility, 49 ETHICS 329, 336 (1939).
36 E.g., Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 674 (1968) ("[I]n the standard case
of responsibility for harm, there can be no liability without contributory fault."); cf Mari J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 374-
76 (1987) (construing the standard objection to reparations as emanating from the requirements of
standing, privity, and nexus in American law); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 1-3 (1988) (noting this feature of American jurisprudence, and arguing that it reflects only
men's existential experiences). But see, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.
1989) (holding multiple manufacturers of DES, a drug ingested by the mothers of the plaintiff class
during pregnancy that caused cancer in plaintiffs, liable in an amount proportional to the share of the
market each manufacturer occupied at the time of ingestion).
3' Three strands of liability doctrine-accomplice, vicarious, and joint and several-permit
assignments of liability for the misdeeds of others. Nonetheless, these are exceptions to foundational
principles in criminal and tort law, which, respectively, insist that guilt accrue only to the individual
wrongdoer, see, e.g., Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity,
105 COLUM L. REV. 1751, 1768 (2005) (referring to personal culpability as "the first principle of
domestic criminal law"), and require that the faulty party proximately cause the injury, see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("An actor's liability is
limited to those physical harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.").
38 Lewis, supra note 34, at 121.
39 Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1546.
40 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 706.
41 MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 142 (2000).
42 See THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing that most accounts of collective responsibility
presuppose that members will have had the possibility to influence the actions for which they are held
derivatively responsible).
Journal of Law & Politics
committed while she was a member in it. Moreover, we shall see that the
reasons offered to defend collective responsibility implicitly rely upon the
individual's ability to control the group. Two implications thus follow:
first, these accounts of collective responsibility cannot be extended to
historical injustices, like slavery, for it is clear that current citizens have no
ability to control the 150-year-old actions of the United States. Second,
and more damningly, these accounts crucially rest upon individualist
understandings of responsibility, and so fail to be collective in the requisite
sense.
In other words, the debate about Black reparations reveals deep lacunae
in our conceptions of responsibility that have heretofore gone unnoticed. If
existing accounts of responsibility condition responsibility assignments on
an individual's participation in, or influence over, the group act, then we
are left with no way to explain when (or if) a group member may be held
responsible for a group act that occurred long ago or far away. In
particular, we are without the theoretical resources to establish that
contemporary citizens bear a moral obligation to redress the harms of
slavery or other acts of past racial injustice.43
The primary purpose of this Article is thus to expose the inadequacies
in our existing theories of responsibility, and develop a novel account that
would license responsibility ascriptions for historical injustices. This
account will, I believe, secure the justificatory force necessary for the
reparationist to establish that contemporary citizens do indeed owe a duty
of repair. A secondary task of the Article is to develop a theory of harm
that explains why contemporary Blacks are the legitimate objects of that
duty.
13 Some authors have argued that citizens owe a moral duty to repair in virtue of the civic
responsibility citizens bear, which requires each "to do his fair part in honoring the nation's
obligations." Robert Fullinwider, The Case for Reparations, 20 PHIL. & PUB. POL. 1, 2 (2000); see
also Brooks, supra note 25, at 279-80 (arguing that civic responsibility is a more appealing concept
than guilt in explaining contemporary citizens' obligations to make repair since contemporary citizens
did not commit the wrongs for which repair is sought); cf Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 725 ("If
society as a collective entity is morally responsible, then its members may be called upon, as an
incident of membership-not personal blame-to share the cost incurred by society in meeting its
moral obligations.") (emphasis added). Yet obligations grounded in civic responsibility do not have a
sufficiently reparative dimension to count as obligations of repair; we may have a civic responsibility to
help those citizens who, through sheer bad luck, live below the poverty line, suffer from natural
disasters, lost loved ones on September 1 Ph, and so on. Thus, we can discharge those obligations we
incur as a matter of civic responsibility without acknowledging any personal connection to the harm
that we thereby eliminate. But repair requires not just restoration of the victim class, but also expiation
on the part of those who wronged the victims. I go on to argue, in Part IV, that it is we who have
harmed the legitimate beneficiaries of Black reparations. As such, we would fail to acknowledge our
guilt were we to understand our duty to make repair in terms of civic responsibility alone.
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I begin, in Part II, with the debate between individual and collective
theories of responsibility. I first describe how each of these accounts
underpins one side of the reparations debate, and then argue that the debate
has thus far been insoluble not because it involves two distinct and
irreconcilable accounts of responsibility, but because individualist
commitments, which cut against reparations, operate on both sides.
In Part III, I step back from accounts of group responsibility and
consider an account of group ontology. I argue that, insofar as group
members are responsible for the group's existence as a moral agent, they
are responsible for discharging the group's debts, no matter when these are
due. In Part IV, I use the lessons of this account of group ontology to
establish that the nation, as a whole, was responsible for slavery at the time
that it occurred, and that contemporary citizens bear responsibility for
slavery insofar as they are responsible for the nation's continued existence.
Part V is devoted to the second challenge facing a program of Black
reparations - that of developing a theory of harm that would encompass
contemporary African Americans. I argue that the harm to be repaired is
not slavery itself but instead the continued failure to offer Black
reparations, which carries with it the prospect of unjust enrichment for
Whites and devastating effects for perceptions of the worth of Blacks. I
conclude that contemporary citizens are morally responsible for creating
and perpetuating a culture of omission in which we not only fail to
discharge our debts, but also communicate our indifference to those who
have legitimate claims against us.
II. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COLLECTIVE PRODUCTIVITY
"I the Lord your God am a jealous God, punishing children for the
iniquity of parents, to the third and fourth generation .... "44
Judeo-Christian religions may sanction the visitation of the sins of
fathers on their sons, but, in secular life, we generally think it
impermissible to transmit punishments intergenerationally. The task for
the reparationist, then, is to offer an account of collective responsibility
that elides this firmly held intuition.45 The individualist opponent of Black
44 Deuteronomy 5:9.
45 Even George Fletcher, an advocate of collective responsibility, refers to the transmission of guilt
from culpable to non-culpable individuals as a "perversion" of collectivism. Fletcher, supra note 32, at
1546.
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reparations is not without his burden either, though, for he must explain
how an institution like slavery can come about, given that it is greater than
the sum of the individual contributions of slave-owners and slave
supporters. In other words, she must account for the existence of
genuinely collective products.
In this Part, I treat first individualism, and then collectivism. I describe
the implications of each for reparations, and then draw out the deficiencies
internal to each theory. I offer a solution to the individualist's difficulties
here. The collectivist's deficiencies are not as easily remedied. I thus end
this Part by suggesting that we abandon traditional accounts of collective
responsibility, and I devote the next Part to offering an alternative account.
A. Individualism, Reparations, and Liability
46
Individualists deny that agents may be held responsible for the actions
of others.47 Instead, even where several agents together cause a harmful
effect, each agent may be held responsible only for her contribution, and
only if her contribution was faulty.48 Correspondingly, liability may be
imposed on each individual only to the extent that her faulty contribution
led to harm.49
46 "Individualism" is sometimes raised in the reparations debate to refer to the responsibility that
Blacks bear for their situation. See, e.g., James P. Hackney, Jr., Ideological Conflict, African American
Reparations, Tort Causation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1193,
1193 (2004) (describing individualism as the principle that each of us should make his way in life
based on the contents of his character, rather than his race, class, or gender); Lee A. Harris,
"Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slaverv Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409,
414-417 (2003) (same). Other theorists have invoked individualism in the debate about reparations to
refer to a notion of individuality that prevents Whites from seeing themselves as members of a
privileged group and hence implicated in Black-White disparities. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks,
Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903,
912 (2003). As I use it in this Article, however, "individualism" designates a cluster of theories
describing when one may legitimately be held accountable for a wrongful act. As such, the sort of
individualist theories at issue here bear on whether contemporary Americans may be held responsible
for slavery or its legacy, and not whether African Americans bear some contributory fault for their
current situation, or whether Whites are appropriately described as a group.
17 For the sake of clarity, it will be useful to note that I use "responsibility" as shorthand for "moral
responsibility" and interchangeably with "culpability" and "accountability." By "liability," on the
other hand, I mean the duty to make whole as a matter of restitution or reconciliation. As should
become clear in what follows, I believe that an individual may be liable to make repair even if she is
not responsible-that is, culpable-for the harm occasioning the need for repair.
48 See, e.g., Nicholas Rescher, Collective Responsibility: Am I Responsible for the Misdeeds of
Others?, in REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY: A READER 169, 179 (Ronald P. Salzberger & Mary C. Turck
eds., 2004).
49 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 34. Joel Feinberg offers a paradigmatic statement of the position.
Feinberg, supra note 36, at 674 ("[I]n the standard case of responsibility for harm, there can be no
liability without contributory fault."). Christopher Kutz describes a related position in his Individual
Difference Principle, which he denies. CHRISTOPHER KUTz, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A
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Individualism thus impugns the claim that the nation as a whole - even
at the time of slavery - ought to have been held liable for slavery. The
individualist could assent to the claim about national liability only if every
American wrongfully contributed to slavery. But many Americans did not
participate in slavery, and some even worked tirelessly to eradicate it. So,
if individualism is true, then the claim that the nation ought to have been
held liable to redress slaves is false. Moreover, if it would have been
impermissible to hold the nation liable for making repair at the time that
slavery ended, it would afortiori be impermissible to hold the nation today
to this duty, given that contemporary citizens would not even have had the
opportunity to prevent or end slavery.5°
Is the individualist right that only slave-owners could justifiably have
been made to pay reparations to emancipated slaves? More generally,
ought responsibility to be keyed to individual actions in the way that
individualism assigns responsibility? The individualist's account of
responsibility presupposes that we can individuate actions and their effects,
and thereby determine exactly who caused what. But this conception of
agency ignores the fact that no one acts in a vacuum. Others' actions can
influence our own,51 and their effects can combine with ours to form a
product that can no longer be divided into distinct individualized
contributions. 52 This is true for slavery, despite the North's professed
opposition to that practice, and despite abolitionist efforts to end it, as we
shall see in Part V.
COLLECTIVE AGE 3 (2000) ("I am only accountable for a harm if something I did made a difference to
its occurrence.").
The doctrine of respondeat superior might seem to pose a challenge to the individualist paradigm.
Nonetheless, even this doctrine can be construed in individualist terms insofar as the employer is
responsible for having hired that employee, or for failing adequately to supervise the employee.
50 For a general statement that a denial of collective responsibility forecloses the transmission of
liability to future generations, see Ton Van den Beld, Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated
Evil Persist over Generations?, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 181, 188 (2002).
"1 See, e.g., Larry May, Collective Inaction and Shared Responsibility, 24 NOOS 269, 273-74
(1990).
52 Some egalitarians and feminists rely on this expansive notion of responsibility for a product in
order to defend redistribution or compel recognition of women's work. See, e.g., EVA FEDER KITTAY,
LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY AND DEPENDENCY (1999) (criticizing theories of
formal equality because these neglect the fact that women are often saddled with dependency work,
which entails that they are not symmetrically situated to the men with whom they are supposed to enjoy
equality); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 321 (1999) ("From
the point of view of justice, the attempt ... to credit specific bits of output to specific bits of input by
specific individuals represents an arbitrary cut in the causal web that in fact makes everyone's
productive contribution dependent on what everyone else is doing. Each worker's capacity to labor
depends on a vast array of inputs produced by other people-food, schooling, parenting and the like.").
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But first it will be important to understand the general implications of
group productivity for distributing liability among group members. There
are four general cases that we need to consider. First, and simplest, is the
case of equal participation, where each individual contributes to a group
action in the same way and to the same extent. For example, consider two
people who together move a heavy table, with each carrying an equal share
of the load. In the second set of cases, each individual engages in a
discrete act of wrongdoing, and together these acts produce a larger wrong.
Consider, for example, the individual who, with others in a mob,
participates in a riot, and smashes a store window on her own during this
riot. The third case involves group action where at least some of the
individual contributions make no difference to the group's eventual course.
For example, a group of ten people decides that they will vote to see
whether the group sees a movie or goes for coffee.- Seven people vote in
favor of coffee. The resulting group act is overdetermined - had any one
of the group members voted the other way, the group would still have gone
for coffee. Finally, there is the case where individuals together produce a
joint product but each individual's contributions differ from those of the
others in magnitude or kind. I consider the appropriate liability
distributions for each of these cases in turn.
In the case of equal participation, the liability assignment is
straightforward. If both individuals act equally negligently in carrying a
table whose weight they evenly share, and the table falls and breaks, then
liability ought to be equally apportioned between them. This is the
individualist's paradigmatic situation of group action, where that action is
nothing more than the aggregation of individual acts.53
The second case, in which the individual's contribution to the group act
is itself culpable, is more difficult but also far less relevant for our
purposes than the remaining two cases. In our hypothetical mob scene, we
may well want to assign liability to a group member both for the joint
product of the group's actions (the riot), as well as the discrete elements of
the group act in which she alone participated (smashing a window). The
question then is how the two liability assignments ought to be combined.
The answer to that question would be relevant if we wanted to determine
how much liability each slaveholder bore, since each both engaged in an
act of individual wrongdoing and also contributed to the institution of
slavery by, for example, affirming slavery's propriety through his
53 See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1509-10.
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slaveholding. Since we are concerned with the question of the liability that
contemporary citizens ought to bear, however, and since no contemporary
citizen owned or owns slaves, we may set aside questions about combined
liability assignments in what follows.
It is in the last two cases - where group acts are overdetermined, or
where they result from members' unequal contributions - that we depart
significantly from the individualist's account of liability distribution. In
the case of overdetermined group acts, individualists have insisted that it
would be unfair to hold any of the individual agents responsible, since their
contributions will have made no difference to the final product.54 Yet even
if the act could have been performed with a smaller number of participants,
there is no way to determine who among the participants was superfluous.
The question is not an epistemic one; instead, there just is no fact of the
matter or principle that would allow us to distinguish between the
contributors. Thus, for example, where seven out of ten people vote in
favor of going for coffee, one of the seven could have voted the other way
without affecting the result. But this is true of each of them, so there is no
one voter in particular whose vote was unnecessary. As such, each of the
seven ought to be held equally accountable for the result.
5
Finally, we come to the case of differential contributions to the group
act. Here, too, I believe that each ought to bear equal liability for the
result, in contrast to the individualist, who insists upon liability
proportionate to contribution.56 To see that equal sharing of liability is
appropriate in these cases, consider a variation on our table-moving
example, such that the two table movers are now unequally matched in
strength. While the first mover, Strong, is insufficiently powerful to move
the table on her own, she does supply twice as much power as Weak does
when they move the table together. If all goes well with the table moving,
is Strong twice as responsible for the table's displacement? No, because
Weak's contribution is just as necessary as Strong's is. Put another way,
Weak and Strong are symmetrically situated with respect to each other
since each is just as dependent as the other for help in moving the table.
54 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 34, at 143 ("Where all are responsible no one is responsible"). But
see Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (1902) (holding that, where fire was caused by two defendants acting
independently, a court may find both liable).
55 Indeed, responsibility is borne equally not just among the coffee voters, but among all of the
group's members, since all ratified the decision procedure, and all agreed to go along with its result. I
elaborate on this argument in the next Part. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 34, at 129-30.
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Moreover, the result is the same where individuals' contributions differ
in kind, rather than just in magnitude. To return to our riot example, the
mob member who commits no acts of vandalism himself, but merely
stands on the sideline cheering on other vandals, will bear equal
responsibility for the resulting acts of destruction if his cheering was in
some way necessary to the riot's occurrence (say, because it communicated
that storeowners were unworthy of the respect that would protect their
property from vandalism). In this way, even symbolic contributions can
ground liability assignments.
In short, then, no matter the nature of individuals' contributions, or the
structure of the group act, liability for a combined result ought to be shared
equally. While we have just articulated this principle in the context of
aggregative action, we will have occasion to return to this principle in the
next Part, where we will see that equal liability applies in the context of
more cohesive forms ofjoint action as well.58
B. Collective Responsibility
Individualist accounts of responsibility derive their appeal from our
intuition that blame and guilt presuppose individual wrongdoing, and
punishment ought thus to be restricted to individual wrongdoers.5 9 Even in
the cases of combined action that we considered in the last section, liability
was distributed only among those who contributed directly to the wrongful
act. So far, then, we have remained faithful to the individualist insistence
that fault presupposes direct participation in the faulty act. Yet these
responsibility assignments do not exhaust the space of our moral practice.
We sometimes speak as if action is most appropriately ascribed to a group
first and foremost, and our responses to such action are directed to all of
the group's members, regardless of the extent of their participation.
Moreover, we expect groups to redress their transgressions no matter who
happens to be on their rosters at the time their debts are discharged.6 °
57 For more on the way that individuals instantiate their values through their actions, see JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1947).58 The acts of nations, which cannot be so easily disaggregated into their individual contributions,
will concern us especially there.
59 See, e.g., Osiel, supra note 37, at 1765-68.
60 To see this intuition in action, witness any lawsuit against a corporation-a complete turnover in
the identities of shareholders and employees since the occurrence of the alleged harm would in no way
impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claim. Cf Complaint, Hurdle v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., No. C-
02-4170 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2002); Complaint, Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 02-2712 (E.D. La.
Sept. 3, 2002); Complaint, Barber v. N.Y. Life Ins., No. 02-CV-2084 (D.N.J. May 1, 2002); Complaint,
Carrington v. Fleetboston Fin. Corp., No. CV-02-1863 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Complaint, Farmer-
Paellman v. Fleetboston Fin. Corp., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Complaint, Madison
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Proponents of collective responsibility offer their accounts as a means of
making sense of this feature of our moral practice.
According to the collectivist, groups can believe, intend, and act
freely. 61 That is, groups are agents in just the same way that individuals
are. 62  As such, groups themselves are appropriate subjects of moral
responsibility. Participants in a group are held responsible for its acts,
then, simply in virtue of their participation; where the group itself is guilty,
group members are guilty by association. As Christopher Kutz writes,
"[w]hen we act together, we are each accountable for what all do, because
we are each authors of our collective act.' 63
Now, Kutz believes that this is most obviously true in the case of
ephemeral groups, 64 which are constituted through the collective act. As
such, participation in the product - and thus accountability for it -
necessarily goes hand in hand with membership. Thus, the group that had
a picnic consists of just those individuals who intended to and did
participate in the picnic. Yet he, along with other collectivists,65 endorses
collective accountability for the harmful actions of institutional or
longstanding groups, where this accountability is to be transmitted to each
of the group's members even though some of those members may not have
contributed to the harmful actions at all. 66 Thus, an employee may be
responsible for the misdoings of her firm simply in virtue of her ongoing
relationship with her firm, her adherence to the firm's norms and
procedures, and her self-understanding as a participant in the firm.
In order to justify holding members accountable for group acts in which
they may not have participated, collectivists focus on the concrete or
psychological benefit that group membership confers. 67 Because this
v. Fleetboston Fin. Corp., No. CV-02-1864 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Complaint, In re African Am.
Descendants' Slave Litig., No. MDL-1491, 2004 WL 3688461 (N.D. I11. Apr. 5, 2004). These
plaintiffs sued multiple corporations and their predecessors in interest for the roles that they and their
predecessors played in American slavery. Each of these complaints is saddled with the different
problem of bringing suit against corporations that have themselves undergone transformations in
identity through mergers and acquisitions.
61 See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 41, at 149-51; KUTz, supra note 49, at 74-96.
62 1 go on to deny this contention below. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
63 KUTZ, supra note 49, at 138.
6 ld. at 138-39.
65 See, e.g., PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 17-18 (1984);
GILBERT, supra note 41, at 107-22.
66 KUTZ, supra note 49, at 156-63.
67 For accounts of collective responsibility grounded in the concrete benefits of group membership,
see KUTZ, supra note 49, at 155-57; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 703. For those accounts that
justify collective responsibility on psychological grounds, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the
Boundaries of the Self 105 HARv. L. REV. 959 (1992); Shiffrin, supra note 32.
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benefit is not temporally indexed - that is, because one benefits from being
a member of the group no matter when in the group's history one belongs
to it - collectivists contend that one can be made to carry the group's
burdens no matter when in the history of the group these burdens were
incurred. It follows that members may be held responsible for a
transgression of the group even if this transgression occurred well before
their tenure in the group. As such, the fact that slavery ended a century
and a half ago would be irrelevant for the collectivist. If the nation is
responsible for slavery, then so are contemporary citizens (or so the
argument would go).
68
The offending commitment in collectivism is thus the one that finds
group members derivatively responsible for the group's transgressions -
that is, responsible for these transgressions solely by virtue of their
membership in the group. Yet, as we inquire further into the reasons for
which collectivists defend derivative responsibility, we shall see that these
cannot sustain responsibility ascriptions for historical transgressions.
As we have seen,69 collectivists mean different things when they point
to the benefits of membership to ground members' responsibility for group
action. Some collectivists maintain that group members appropriately
incur derivative responsibility in exchange for the concrete benefits that
group membership affords. 70  On a second understanding, responsibility
results as a corollary of the member's identification with the group's
positive acts, and the corresponding feelings of pride the member enjoys. 71
Shame, and thus liability, follow from this positive identification not as a
matter of reciprocity, as in the first understanding, but instead as a matter
of psychological consistency.72
68 "Feelings of pride and identification substantially contribute to and reflect what is presupposed
by these forms of focused joint collaboration. But ... then it should also follow that we must take on
as part of our identification and acknowledge responsibility-as a group-for our bad actions in the
past as well-even if no one of us is responsible for these actions and even if we all now would
forswear such actions as antithetical to our identity and commitments." Shifflin, supra note 32, at 7.
69 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 49, at 156 ("When we act together, we must expect that the group act
may have aspects we do not know about but with which we will have to reckon .... The possibility of
expanding our powers (or rewards) through cooperation entails the risk that the resulting act will not
align with our moral interests."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 717-18 ("The consideration for such
advantages gained from group membership is that burdens incurred or experienced by the collective
group may fairly be shared by the entire membership,"); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 703
("People enter relationships in order to obtain the benefits of collective action; in the process they
become blameworthy for the harms that occur as a result of collective action.").
71 See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 67; Shiffrin, supra note 32.
72 "[T]here must be a group of objects and events-the space shuttle and the Vietnam War are
perhaps good examples-that are so prominently linked to American identity that virtually every
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Contrary to the collectivists' arguments, however, our everyday moral
judgments suggest that neither. reciprocity nor psychological identification
furnish a sufficient reason for holding group members derivatively
responsible for the group's acts. Instead, as we shall now see, each of the
two considerations is simply an effect of group membership, not a ground
of members' obligations.
Taking the issue of reciprocity first, consider that individuals who are
not part of the group may yet benefit from its transgressions. For example,
a company that violates an environmental protection law in order to
manufacture, and thus sell, its wares at a discounted price benefits not only
shareholders but also non-shareholding consumers of the resulting
products.73 If members (shareholders), but not nonmembers (consumers),
are to be held responsible for the resulting harm (environmental damage),
it cannot be the fact of benefit alone that explains the responsibility
ascription. Thus, benefiting from a group transgression is not a sufficient
condition for being held responsible for that transgression. But neither is
benefiting from membership necessary to justify the responsibility
ascription. Is the disgruntled participant absolved of her duty to try to steer
the group away from wrongdoing because she does not happen to be
benefiting from her membership? In short, benefiting from membership is
not even relevant to determining whether members may be held
responsible for the group's activities.
Do considerations of identity provide a better ground for holding group
members responsible? These too prove to be irrelevant. An individual
American sees herself as the author of at least some of them and feels pride or shame with regard to
them. Denying responsibility for all such objects and events is tantamount to repudiating one's
American identity altogether." Dan-Cohen, supra note 67, at 98; see also GILBERT, supra note 41, at
129 (describing "membership remorse," the remorse felt by group members just in virtue of their
membership); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 710 (describing a similar phenomenon as "moral
taint"); Shiffrin, supra note 32, at 7. Stanley Bates offers an evocative statement of the phenomenon
when he quotes a Vietnam veteran who, upon learning of the massacre at My Lai, exclaimed, "'I
wanted to get those people. I wanted to reveal what they did. My God, when I first came home, I
would tell my friends about this and cry-literally cry. As far as I was concerned, it was a reflection on
me, on every American, on the ideals that we supposedly represent."' Stanley Bates, My Lai and
Vietnam: The Issues of Responsibility, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE
AT MY LAI, supra note 34, at 143, 158. Alasdair Maclntyre makes an even stronger claim when he
argues that individuals are partially constituted by the histories of their families and cultural groups, so
that liability follows not as a matter of a self-chosen identity but instead as a matter of metaphysics.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 220-21 (2d ed. 1984).
73 See also Thomas Nagel, Introduction, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT xi
(Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel & Thomas Scanlon eds., 1977) (presenting the fictitious but plausible
case of an Egyptian flax grower at the time of slavery who benefits from the influx of American cotton
on the world market, and denying that this flax grower could be held responsible for slavery or its
economic effects).
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who is not a member of the group may experience a psychological
connection to it no less fierce than that which members enjoy. Consider an
American Francophile who has never visited France, purchased anything
from France, or contributed to France in any other way. (Imagine that his
Francophilia is satisfied by watching French films when these air on
television and listening to French language tapes that he borrows from the
library.) No matter the extent of his French pride or shame, it would be
both incorrect and unfair to conclude that he was responsible for any
French achievements or missteps.74 If true Frenchmen are to be held
responsible for these, then a psychological connection to France must not
itself be sufficient. But nor is that connection even necessary. The
disaffected American who laments every U.S. policy decision and
vocalizes his contempt for the nation to all who will listen may well bear
no less responsibility for American transgressions than does the diehard
patriotic citizen. Psychological identification, then, like the receipt of
material benefits, turns out to be beside the point when it comes to
grounding group members' responsibility for group wrongdoing.
Perhaps what matters, then, is neither the material nor the psychological
benefit an individual derives from group membership, but instead the
opportunity to control the group's activities. 75 Indeed, what distinguishes
the shareholder or Frenchman from other consumers and Francophiles,
respectively, is the relative ability of each to affect the course of his
group's activities.76 Of course, this ability exists only during the member's
tenure in the group. As such, locating derivative responsibility in
members' opportunities to control their groups entails that members may
74 This point is just a specific application of Hume's statement that one cannot derive an "ought"
from an "is." DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § 2 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
1978); cf THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 12 (objecting to accounts of collective identity predicated on
individuals' self-conceptions on the ground that not all those who are group members, and thus ought
to share responsibility, will in fact conceive of themselves as such).
75 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 36, at 687 ("[l]f the conditions of justifiable collective liability-
group solidarity, prior notice, opportunity for control, etc.-are not satisfied, group liability in these
cases would seem unjustified.") (emphasis added); see also THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing
that most accounts of collective responsibility presuppose that members will have had the possibility to
influence the actions for which they are held derivatively responsible).
76 It may be that membership not only facilitates but also compels intervention in the group's
endeavors where the group threatens to engage in wrongdoing. For example, an obligation to
discourage group wrongdoing (or at least refrain from encouraging it) would arise in virtue of
membership itself if the groups to which we belonged and the actions they undertook were taken to
reflect our own attitudes about the individuals whom these actions touched. See KUTZ, supra note 49,
at 139-40. On the other hand, the obligation to deter the group from wrongdoing may be one that both
members and non-members bear, but of which many (if not all) non-members are relieved given the
difficulty of affecting the group as an outsider.
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be held responsible only for group transgressions that occur during the
course of their membership.77 In other words, if this is the ground for
collective responsibility, then group members may be held accountable
only for contemporaneous injustices.
Yet even when they are restricted in this way, responsibility
assignments are likely to be problematic, if not false, for at least some
group members. Should the faculty member on sabbatical when her
department made a commitment to pursue some project be bound by the
obligations that result from the commitment?78 What about the group
member who strenuously and steadfastly fought against a proposed course
of action - if he could not have done any more than he did to oppose this
course, can we still say that he had the ability to control the eventual group
action?79 Or, to take a more mundane example, do we really expect that
citizens will follow every legislative activity, and lobby their politicians in
favor or against proposed bills, such that we could honestly contend that
each citizen had the opportunity to control Congress's activities?8°
If we are right to worry about questions like these, then we will think it
fair to ascribe responsibility only after we assess the situation of each
participant to determine whether the opportunity for control was, in fact,
within his grasp. But once we undertake an individualized assessment of
this kind, we will not have moved very far beyond an individualist
assignment of responsibility. In this way, collective responsibility, at least
insofar as it is grounded in a member's opportunity to control group action,
reduces to individual responsibility.
It is no surprise, then, that reparationists have failed to secure the moral
ground for their position. The theories of responsibility to which they
point justify responsibility ascriptions only for contemporaneous injustices.
But slavery is an ancient injustice, and so collectivism cannot do the
requisite justificatory work. Moreover, these theories require that we
evaluate individually each member's opportunity to control the group. In
77 The statements of Posner and Vermeule, and of Kutz, cited supra note 70, reflect this
presupposition insofar as they contemplate roughly contemporaneous benefits and missteps.
78 Cf Feinberg, supra note 36, at 687-88 (using the example of a philosophy department that had
approved a student's thesis prospectus after two of its members agreed to supervise the project, and
then found itself saddled with this student once both members had left the department).
79 This is just the case of the ardent abolitionist. See infra Part I.C.
80 Bruce Ackerman, for one, has argued that citizens will likely privilege their private pursuits over
political engagement. He thus recommends that citizens be called upon to engage politically only when
their constitutional regime faces a possible transformation. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 231-65 (1991).
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this way, collectivist accounts embody the very individualist commitments
that militate against reparations.
At this point, the reparationist faces two possible escape routes. She
can try to locate yet another ground of responsibility that would not render
her account reducible to individualism, or she can abandon the project of
finding a genuinely collectivist ground for responsibility and instead
attempt to enlarge our understanding of group action so that we can hold
all members accountable for group actions in virtue of some indirect
contribution that each makes. In the next Part, I adopt the latter course,
although I leave open the possibility that collectivism could be
rehabilitated were some other ground of collective responsibility to be
found.
I1. GROUP ONTOLOGY
In this Part, I offer an account of group ontology that allows us to see
that all members of a group contribute to each of its acts insofar as all are
responsible for its agency. To this end, I first argue that group identity
consists of nothing more than a group's defining characteristics. I then
argue that the apparent agency of groups derives from actions in which
each member participates.
A. Group Identity
"The people of America today is the people of white, propertied,
Christian males who founded the Constitution in the 1780s, who gave itself
self-government with one hand while branding slaves ... with the other.
That people grew into this one; we are they.,
81
"The story of the Negro in America is the story of America."
82
Collectivists generally believe that groups exist over and above the
83members that constitute them. It is certainly true that the identity of a
group is independent of the identities of its members, so that changes in the
81 JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 158 (2001).
82 James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son, in COLLECTED ESSAYS 5, 19 (1998).
83 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT, supra note 73, at 84, 125 (arguing that a group is an entity with a distinct identity that
persists independently of the identities of its members); GILBERT, supra note 41, at 2-4 (arguing for the
existence of a "plural subject").
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group's roster need not change the nature of the group itself.84 Yet, from
the fact that a group's distinguishing characteristics may be independent of
those of its members, we ought not hastily to conclude that the group
enjoys an existence over and above those characteristics. Instead, the
group itself, considered apart from its members, may consist of nothing
more than its defining features, in much the same way that a melody
consists of nothing more than its notes.85
To see this, consider the following examples of group transitions. In
the first, individuals join together to form a social group. Later, the
individuals disband, and an entirely different set of individuals bands
together to form a group with the same name. The new group expressly
repudiates all of the old group's purposes and activities. It is reasonable to
conclude that the new group is not the same as the old group - it shares
nothing more with the old group than its name.
Contrast this with a case in which a group again undergoes a complete
change of roster, except now new members identify with the old group and
adopt most of its purposes and activities. Here, it would seem like the new
group is sufficiently continuous with the old group for us to consider both
to be the same group. Thus, for example, the resurrected fraternity chapter
that renounces the hazing rituals practiced by the chapter's earlier
incarnation is numerically identical to the earlier chapter so long as the
current fraternity members willingly inherit other features of the group's
identity, like its traditions, history, and so on, and expect to be recognized
as a current instantiation of that earlier chapter.
What distinguishes the first case from the second is the members'
choice in the first case to effectively obliterate the old group, and, in the
second case, to carry the group on. But if there really were some group-
entity that existed over and above the group's characteristics and the
members themselves, then a decision among the members to change the
group's characteristics would not be so determinative of the group's
identity.
Moreover, this reductionist take on group identity remains true even
where group members have less than total control over the form of the
84 See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 49, at 72 (arguing that a group is nonextensional insofar as its identity
is independent of the identities of its members).
85 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO: AN EXISTENTIALIST THEORY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS 73-74 (Forrest Williams & Robert Kirkpatrick trans., 1937) ("If we take a melody, for
example, it is useless to presuppose an X which would serve as a support for the different notes ....
The subject of the predicate here will be the concrete totality, and the predicate will be a quality
abstractly separated from the totality, a quality which has its full meaning only if one connects it again
to the totality.").
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group's survival. To see this, consider the following two examples. In the
first case, a set of individuals takes up most, or even all, of a group's
practices, but gives itself a new name, and expects that the "new" group
will be taken to be a different entity from the group with the old name.
Thus, for example, consider Philip Morris's decision to change its name to
Altria in the wake of the tobacco litigation. 6 In the second case, the same
individuals who belonged to an old group decide to replace their group
with a group with new practices (and perhaps a new name), and they also
expect their group to be treated like a different entity. Take, for example,
the transition from Nazi Germany to post-war Germany.
Both cases pose a challenge to the supposition that members determine
whether groups persist through time. But if outsiders to the group insist on
treating Altria as if it were nothing more than Philip Morris sporting a new
name, this does not yet establish that a group can enjoy an existence that is
irreducible to the group's identifying characteristics. It establishes only
that members' decisions about group persistence through time are not
wholly determinative; instead, the perceptions and expectations of
outsiders also have a role to play. Sometimes, outsiders will refuse to
acknowledge a change in the group's identity for schematic reasons - the
actual change in the group's features is so insignificant that it would
frustrate our schemes for identifying groups were we to countenance the
proffered change in identity (hence, the skepticism that Altria really is
anything other than Philip Morris).87 But in other instances, the refusal is
prudentially based. Thus, for example, having rewritten its constitution
and repudiated the horrific Nazi acts, post-war Germany could successfully
convince the world that a new regime had taken hold. Nonetheless, the
new regime had prudential reasons for acceding to demands for repair:
88
the perpetually self-inventing nation is not one with which other nations
will likely deal for fear that this nation's transformative impulses will rear
their head whenever the nation might otherwise be called to account for
wrongdoing. For this reason, then, post-war Germany would be taken to
constitute a new group, but one that would be saddled with the debts of the
old group as the price of establishing its good faith.89
86 See, e.g., Stuart Elliot, If Philip Morris Becomes Altria, Its Corporate Image May Lose Some of
the Odor of Stale Smoke, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at C13.
87 See, e.g., National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, Philip Morris Can't Hide,
http://tfk.grassroots.com/pmch/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
88 This is not to suggest, however, that prudential reasons represented the sole motivation for
offering repair.
89 Cf THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 51 (arguing that a new regime might undertake reparations in
order to convince outsiders that it repudiated the practices of the old nation).
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More generally, while members have control over the content of the
group's core commitments, they have no such control over the group's
past. As a group establishes itself, it becomes identifiable by those outside
of the group too. As such, newer initiates into the group cannot pretend
that it is distinct from a group of the past even while they embrace parts of
the history of that earlier group. Likewise, members cannot revise or
rewrite the history of the group at whim if they expect that others will treat
the group as self-identical over time. In short, both members and outsiders
have a role to play in determining whether and in what form a group
persists. But the important point for our purposes is that, together,
members and outsiders completely determine whether and in what form a
group persists. As such, the group's traditions, cultures, values, and so on
"maintain their significant character" only through "a continuous current of
individual minds."90
B. Group Agency
"Everybody is co-responsible for the way he is governed." 91
If I am right that a group is nothing more than a set of identifying
characteristics, then group agency is but a convenient fiction. For a group,
as nothing more than a set of predicates, cannot act at all, let alone act in a
way that would appropriately subject it to our moral responses. Instead,
the moral agency of the group depends on two features, both of which
issue from the direct actions of individual members. First, the group must
be able to have action performed in its name. For this to be the case, some
group members must actually carry out particular acts of the group. Even
more importantly, group members must establish a set of procedures -
90 Morris R. Cohen, Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy, 16 J. PHIL.,
PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 673, 683 (1919); see also id. at 683 ("The unity of France or of the
Catholic Church rests in the mode of thought and action which millions of Frenchmen and Catholics
habitually follow. If by an impossible event they should all simultaneously lose all memory and
habitual manner of responding, the French nation and the Catholic Church would cease to exist.").
Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point about the moral agency of corporations. RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 171 (1986) ("The personification is deep: it consists in taking the corporation seriously
as a moral agent. But it is still a personification not a discovery, because we recognize that the
community has no independent metaphysical existence, that it is itself a creature of the practices of
thought and language in which it figures.").
91 KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 31 (E. B. Ashton trans., 1947) (cited in
George Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective
Guilt, 11l YALE L.J. 1499, 1531 (2002)). See also Annette Baier, Can Individualists Share
Responsibility?, 21 POL. THEORY 228, 234 (1993) ("The dirty hands belong always to the politicians,
not to those who let them be elected and who passively contribute to the maintenance of the institutions
that give them their particular share of power.").
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rules of recognition,92 if you will - that make these acts the group's acts,
rather than those of the individuals who actually carry them out. In this
way, while only some members need participate directly in the group's act,
all are responsible for it qua group act insofar as all are responsible for the
procedures that allow us to attribute the act to the group itself.
The second feature required for group agency is the group's extension
through time. Members who intend that their group enter into
commitments with outsiders effectively promise that the group will persist
until these commitments are fulfilled.93 More generally, for the group to
engage in the sort of moral relationships that persons engage in, the group
cannot be transitory. For our responses to the actions of persons
necessarily arise after these actions occur. Were the group to dissolve
immediately after it acted, our response to its actions would then have no
object.94
But note that those members who ensure the group's persistence
through their membership are not necessarily the same individuals as those
who belonged to the group at the time that it committed a faulty act. It is
in the decision of later members to extend the life of a group that
committed an earlier transgression, then, that we can locate a ground for
holding group members responsible no matter their date of entry into the
group.95
92 See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 81 (2001); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 107-10 (1961); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 32 (1990).
93 Thus, for example, if the United States had entered into a long-term environmental protection
treaty with another country many years ago, a newfound rejection of environmental protection among
contemporary citizens would not license their breaching this treaty. Their change in values would,
however, permit them to refrain from entering into further agreements of this kind no matter whether
this would do violence to the conception that earlier citizens had of their country.
94 Of course, individuals do sometimes spontaneously form groups for the purpose of completing a
distinct act, after which the group disbands. Collectivists believe that, for purposes of assigning
responsibility, it is appropriate to treat these ephemeral groups in the same way that we treat
longstanding groups. See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 49, at 138; Virginia Held, Moral Responsibility and
Collective Action, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE AT MAI LAI, supra
note 34, at 101 (arguing that a random collection of individuals can act together and thus be
collectively responsible). I fail to see what the collectivist assignment of responsibility adds, however.
It makes sense to adopt a group ontology where some, but not all, of the members of a group engage in
wrongdoing. In the case of ephemeral groups, which are constituted by the group action, all of the so-
called members have necessarily committed any wrongful act that the "group" has committed.
Moreover, we can arrive at the collectivist's preferred liability distribution-equal shares among
participants-without relying on notions of collective action, as demonstrated by the liability
distributions in cases of combined individual action that we considered above, see supra text
accompanying notes 53-58.
95 For a different defense of transgenerational obligations, see THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 1-23
(arguing for transgenerational obligations on universality grounds: to the extent that we would expect
future generations to be bound by the commitments we forge, so too must we fulfill the expectation of
earlier generations that we would be bound by the commitments they forged).
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In short, all members are responsible for a group's actions at the time
that they occur, because all of these members are responsible for the
content of the procedures that allow actions to be recognized as those of
the group. All subsequent members are responsible for the consequences
of earlier (as well as contemporaneous) group action, because all of these
members are responsible for conferring agency status on the group.96
This account of group agency combines the lessons we drew from the
individualist-collectivist debate. The account preserves a collectivist spirit
insofar as it acknowledges that group action is a kind of collective product,
since group members who do not participate directly in the group's act are
nonetheless necessary for its occurrence. Yet the account deviates from
collectivism insofar as responsibility refers here not to an assignment
imposed first and foremost on the group and then on its members only
derivatively. Instead, members are actually responsible for group action
insofar as they are responsible for allowing the group to act. On this
understanding of responsibility, then, group action becomes compatible
with the individualist insistence that responsibility presuppose a causal
contribution.
The account has two other advantages over traditional accounts of
collective responsibility. First, it allows us to dispense with concerns that
latecomers to a group ought not to bear responsibility for the group's
earlier transgressions. These concerns are felt in the reparations context
especially, given that many citizens emigrated to the United States well
after abolition.97 On the account of group agency advanced here, however,
immigrants represent the easy case, since their decision to join the nation is
explicit, whereas Americans born here have generally only tacitly accepted
their national membership.
The second advantage arises from the account's reductionism.
Collectivists who contend that groups enjoy an existence over and above
that of their members must establish that the current nation is identical to
96 If this account of group identity is correct, one might think it curious that individuals decide to
perpetuate preexisting groups-particularly those with debts to discharge-rather than constantly
reassembling to form new groups, and thereby freeing themselves of the past's claims. Two prudential
considerations may at least partly explain our attachment to groups that predate us. First, while these
groups may be burdened by obligations, they may also be assigned entitlements. Why not take part in a
group that is about to sow the fruits of the labor of earlier group members? Second, individuals who
are quick to claim a group transformation whenever creditors come knocking on the door risk scaring
away those who would otherwise interact with the group, and thereby forego the prospective benefits of
cooperation, (For more on this point, see supra note 89 and accompanying text.). In addition to these
prudential considerations, it is possible that individuals prefer groups with connections to the past for
the intrinsic value that continuity confers.
97 See, e.g., White, supra note 10.
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the one that participated in slavery if they are to have any hope of
justifying reparations. While several collectivists have noted that national
identity must hold over time if subsequent generations are to incur liability
for the transgressions of earlier ones,98 none of these authors has offered a
theory of national identity over time. Most reparationists have ignored the
question altogether.99 Indeed, until very recently, even political theorists
had dispensed with the question, recoiling from a conception of the nation
that would paint it as a unitary entity, rather than as a collection of
different and frequently unequal peoples.l°°
The account of group ontology offered here circumvents the need to
elaborate a complete theory of the metaphysics of national identity. Recall
that, on a reductionist account, groups are nothing more than their
distinguishing characteristics. In this way, whether and in what form a
group survives is entirely conventional: group members explicitly or
implicitly agree that they will carry on the group's existence. Outsiders
accept or reject changes in the group's defining features according to
conceptual schemes about what makes a group identical over time that are
themselves conventional. Reductionism thus entails that we need not
ascertain what features of groups are essential to their identity, or how
much alteration of these features the group may sustain before it loses its
identity. Instead, reductionism takes group identity out of the metaphysical
realm and places it in the hands of the individuals who, through their
intentions and actions, decide the question themselves.
On the account of group ontology advanced here, then, questions about
the identity of the nation over time find a straightforward answer: insofar
as the changes to the nation have been consistent with the modes of
alteration set out in its founding document, 10 1 and insofar as citizens have
intended to carry on the nation and, to this end, have acted in its name, we
may conclude that the nation that existed at the time of slavery is the same
as the nation we inhabit today.
98 E.g., THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 74-75; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 740-41 (2003).
99 See, e.g., Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 40, 109th
Cong. (2005); BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE
DEBT: WHAT AMERICANS OWE TO BLACKS (2000).
100 Jed Rubenfeld, for example, contends that the idea of a single national people, "[l]ong neglected
by serious political and cultural thought, . .. [has] been left instead to the depredations of fascists and
ethnic cleansers." RUBENFELD, supra note 81, at 147-48. Rubenfeld is undeterred, however, from
providing his own account. See id. at 152-58.
10'But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (arguing that
Reconstruction and the New Deal were revolutionary precisely because they transformed the nation
using extra-constitutional means).
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IV. NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SLAVERY AND REPAIR
"All white people. . . are implicated ... so long as [they] participate in
America in a normal way and attempt to go on leading normal lives while
any race is being cheated and tormented.,
102
The strategy for holding contemporary citizens liable for discharging
the debts to which slavery gave rise should now be clear: by extending the
life of the nation that participated in slavery, contemporary citizens
appropriately incur the debts of this nation. What remains to be
established is that the nation, as a whole, did in fact participate in slavery.
Yet ascribing slavery to the nation as a whole is problematized by three
considerations: first, the apparently private nature of slavery; second,
northern abstention from slavery; and, third, abolitionist resistance to
slavery. I address each of these considerations in turn. 10 3 I end this Part
with a statement of the implications of the nation's involvement in slavery
for contemporary citizens.
A. Governmental Participation in Slavery
Slavery was institutionalized through federal law. 104 In fact, recognition
102 JONATHAN KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS AND MINDS
OF NEGRO CHILDREN IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12 (1985).
103 1 note that a complete response to the first two concerns would entail a lengthy survey of the
vast literature on the nation's complicity in slavery, and hence exceed the scope of this Article. I
restrict myself to key facts necessary to establish the claims I advance. For further information about
the nation's involvement in slavery, see, e.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC:
AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (2002); ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2002); GARRY WILLS, "NEGRO
PRESIDENT": JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER (2003) (arguing that Jefferson acceded to the three-
fifths provision in the Constitution in order to curry political favor); cf Edieth Y. Wu, Reparations to
African Americans: The Only Remedy for the U.S. Government's Failure to Enforce the 13th, 14'h and
15 'h Amendments, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 342,403 (2004) (locating the ground for repair in the nation's
failure to fulfill the Reconstruction Amendments).
'o4 See generally Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 40,
109th Cong. (2005) (finding that "the institution of slavery was constitutionally and statutorily
sanctioned from 1769 through 1865"); Kevin Outterson, Slave Taxes, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?
SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 135, 143 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003)
(hereinafter SHOULD AMERICA PAY?) (describing the federal and state financial gains through the
direct and indirect taxation of slavery); Lyons, supra note 22, at 1385-89 (describing in detail the
federal government's role in slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Donald A. Lancaster,
Jr., Comment, The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States of America's Sanction of Slavery and
Segregation: A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analysis of African American Reparations, 43
How. L.J. 171, 178-82 (2000) (highlighting the articles of the constitution that enshrined property
rights in Black slaves); Does America Owe a Debt to the Descendants of Its Slaves, HARPERS, Nov.
2000, reprinted in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra, at 79, 104-105 (offering a legislative and judicial
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of slaves as property was a condition of confederation, with the
representative of South Carolina threatening to withdraw his state from the
potential union if the Continental Congress even decided to debate the
issue.1°5 The Declaration of Independence, at least as interpreted in the
infamous Dred Scott decision, 106 revealed that neither slaves nor their
descendants were to be "acknowledged as a part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the words used in that memorable
instrument."'' 0 7  Perhaps more famously, the United States Constitution
provided that, for purposes of representation and taxation, each slave
would count as three-fifths of a free man. 108 Another constitutional
provision mandated that fugitive slaves be delivered to their owners,
thereby placing the law of slave-holding states above that of free states. °9
A third provision prohibited Congressional foreclosure on the importation
of slaves until at least 1808, thereby ensuring that American participation
in the international slave trade could continue at least until then.'" 0
Other federal statutes followed. In 1793, Congress passed the Fugitive
Slave Act,' which allowed slave owners to seize their runaway slaves
even if the latter had managed to escape to a state in which slavery had
already been abolished. The Act also imposed fines of $500 on those who
harbored fugitive slaves. 1 2 In addition, slavery provided the revenue that
would protect the country in battle as Congress, on two occasions, raised
money for threatened military engagements by imposing a direct federal
tax on slaves." 3 These efforts reveal not just that the nation facilitated or
history of slavery); David Lyons, Unfinished Business: Racial Junctures in U.S. History and Their
Legacy (Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing the legal
entrenchment of slavery).
105 Outterson, supra note 104, at 143.
106 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856) (finding that the phrase "all men are created
equal" could not have been intended to include "the enslaved African race" for, if it had, the conduct of
the Declaration's drafters "would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they
asserted").
I07 d. at 407.
0 U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 3.
'09 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. For this reason, some reparationists have cited the Takings
Clause of the Constitution as a ground for repair. See, e.g., Dennis Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and
Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1257, 1275 (2004) ("[W]hat was wrong with slavery was that
slaves were treated as things rather than persons."); Yanessa L. Barnard, Note, Better Late Than Never:
A Takings Clause Solution to Reparations, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 109 (2005).
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-03 (repealed 1864).
112 id.
13 The first such occasion sought to finance an anticipated naval engagement against France in
1789, and the second funded the War of 1812. Outterson, supra note 104, at 145-46. Outterson also
describes the indirect financial gains the federal government enjoyed from slavery. For example, it was
only because it had so much cotton to export that the United States imported so freely from Europe,
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gained from slavery in specific ways; its role was far more crucial:
without the coercive power of the state, slavery would have been
pragmatically (if not also conceptually) impossible. 14
Yet some opponents of Black reparations argue that precisely because
slavery was legal, it was not wrong and hence ought not to be subject to
demands for compensation." 5 After all, we would appear to violate the
"prohibition on retroactivity, according to which the legal status of actions
and transactions must be determined by the applicable rules of their time,"
were we to impose duties of repair on those who acted under a legal regime
that countenanced their conduct." 16
Several responses to this objection suggest themselves. First, the legal
status of slavery was assured, at least in part, by denying the franchise to
those who would be enslaved." 7 The fact that slavery was legal thus might
well be construed as symptomatic of the problem, rather than a sign that
there was no problem. Others have similarly argued that, in the antebellum
period, "warlords ha[d] displaced the state and held it at bay while they
imposed their own law on the subjected populations. When the state
becomes strong enough to displace the warlords, it has no moral duty to
respect the warlord's law." ' 1 8 Still others adopt an economic rationale to
defend the retroactive application of moral norms later enshrined in law,
arguing that imposing liability upon those who cooperate with "extremely
immoral yet legally sanctioned practices" may cause these cooperators "to
internalize the bad effects of such practices . . . and thus ameliorate the
systematic competitive advantage such citizens frequently have vis-A-vis
those who refuse to engage in such immoral activities."'" 9
While I find all of these lines of response compelling, they are
unnecessary in light of my account of the harm for which repair is owed.
In what follows, I argue that the harm occasioning repair is not slavery
with duties on imported goods accounting for 90 percent of federal revenues between 1789 and 1815.
Id. at 148.
114 The coercive power of the state is necessary to ensure that each respects the holdings of others.
Without this power, no one would be secure in her possessions. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 74; cf
Alfred L. Brophy, Norms, Law, and Reparations: The Case of the Ku Klux Klan in 1920s Oklahoma,
20 HARV. BLACKLET-rER L.J. 17 (2004) (adopting a similar line of argument to elucidate the
connection between the federal government and the KKK).
115 See, e.g., George Schedler, Responsibility for and Estimation of the Damages of American
Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 307, 346 (2003).
116 Dagan, supra note 18, at 1166.
117 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 711-12.
... Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1219-20 (2004).
119 Dagan, supra note 18, at 1172.
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itself but instead the nation's failure to offer repair for slavery. 120  This
failure waged a dignitary and material injury, and it is this injury that ought
to be redressed. Because, on my account, the harm to be repaired dates
back to the time when slavery was no longer legally sanctioned, opponents
of reparations may not call upon slavery's one-time legality to immunize
themselves from demands for repair.
B. The "Free" States
Despite the fact that slavery was sanctioned at the highest levels of
government, some opponents of Black reparations insist that the nation as a
whole could not have been responsible for slavery since the nation was
starkly divided on slavery's permissibility. Indeed, they contend, so
opposed was the North to slavery that it fought a war to end it.' 2' Yet these
protestations likely confer more virtue on the North than it deserves.
Economic reasons appear to explain the North's abolitionist commitments
better than moral ones do, 122 with the North seeking to secure labor
positions for the growing white population, which it could not easily do so
long as cheap slave labor remained available. In addition, the slave trade
was vital to northern shipping interests. 123 The Civil War also finds its
roots in self-interest rather than righteousness, as the North sought to
preserve the Union and the South sought to preserve slavery. 124 We have
good reason to question the virtue of these Northerners, then, who would
"claim at once the praise of piety for disallowing [slavery] . . . and the
praise of justice for their faithful adherence to a voluntary compact that
120 See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
2 1 Newt Gingrich and George Will are among those who have described the North's reasons for
entering the Civil War in this way. Robert S. McElvaine, They Didn't March To Free the Slaves, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 1997, at B9.
122 See, e.g., James Grahame, Life as a Free Black, in WHO IS TO BLAME? OR CURSORY REVIEW
OF "AMERICAN APOLOGY FOR AMERICAN ACCESSION TO NEGRO SLAVERY" 51 (1842), reprinted in
WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 336. See generally THE ANTI-SLAVERY DEBATE:
CAPITALISM AND ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (Thomas Bender ed.,
1992) (presenting a lively debate about the role of capitalism in the abolitionist movement).
123 Saito, supra note 26, at 44. While it is true that Congress passed a law prohibiting the slave
trade in 1808, which was the earliest it was constitutionally permitted to do so, slavery itself remained
legal until the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, at the close of the Civil War; see David E.
Wilkins, African Americans and Aboriginal Peoples: Similarities and Differences in Historical
Experiences, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 515, 517-18 (2005). Thus, the apparent abolitionist spirit animating
the ban against the slave trade ought to be seen as no more than an instance of "preservation through
transformation." Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
124 McElvaine, supra note 12 1, at B9.
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blends their national name, character, and power with the support and
perpetuation of that practice.'
125
C. Abolitionism and Group Existence
More compelling is the claim that the abolitionist contingent impugns
an ascription of national responsibility for slavery. I believe that the
ascription survives, however, in virtue of two considerations. First, racist
abolitionists may yet have contributed to a culture that would lead to
slavery. Second, non-racist abolitionists would have contributed to the
nation in benign ways that would nonetheless have facilitated its support of
slavery.
Some abolitionists, while clearly opposed to slavery, may yet have
openly harbored racist attitudes toward Blacks. 126 If slavery can be
considered a collective product, its producers ought to include not only
those who owned slaves but also those who expressed white supremacy in
other ways. 127 Both sets of individuals normalized Black inferiority and
thus created a culture in which slavery could flourish. In this way, we can
use our insights of Part III to point to a collective product - a culture of
racism - to which supporters and some opponents of slavery contributed.
They are thus responsible for slavery's existence, whether they endorsed
that practice specifically or not.
Of course, one might object that no individual can be responsible for his
culture, because culture is ontologically prior - it constitutes the
individual. 128 Yet our discussion of group ontology, and the role of
125 James Grahame, Why the North and South Should Have Apologized, in WHO IS To BLAME? 1, 8
(1842), reprinted in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 347, 348.
126 It was certainly clear that the North as a whole engaged in de jure and de facto racial
discrimination. See, e.g., Grahame, supra note 122, at 51 (contending that, in the North, free Blacks
were "sternly excluded from all social equality with the whites, from all political franchises and most
civil rights," and describing an 1828 Connecticut law that denied that free Blacks were citizens of the
United States). Consider also that it was Justice Bradley, appointed to the Supreme Court as part of the
Republicans' strategy of advancing the freedom of Blacks through Reconstruction, see ACKERMAN,
supra note 101, at 211, 247-48, who wrote the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1882),
finding, inter alia, that the Thirteenth Amendment did not prohibit discrimination in places of public
accommodation.
127 Cf LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 51 ("[A]II those people who hold racist attitudes in
communities where racially motivated violence occurs share in the responsibility for these harms.");
Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1524 (defending increased penalties for hate crimes on the ground that any
one of these may incite future acts of violence against members of the victimized group).
128 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982) (arguing that we are
compelled to understand ourselves "as members of this family or community or nation or people, as
bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of this revolution, as citizens of this republic .... To
imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free
and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth."); cf 2
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members in extending the life of a group, puts the lie to this objection:
cultures die out, which suggests that the institution and solidification of a
culture are not sufficient to guarantee its survival. Instead, a culture's
continued vibrancy depends on individuals acting in conformity with their
cultural norms. This action not only reinforces the culture but also serves
to communicate these norms to newer initiates into the culture. In this
way, even if individuals derive their identities from their culture, they may
be held responsible for both further entrenching their culture and
transmitting it to future generations.
More generally, the initial plausibility of cries that "society made her do
it" or that "he was culturally conditioned to engage in wrongdoing" can be
explained by the fact that culture is ubiquitous in a self-obscuring way - its
omnipresence can lead us to believe that it is part of the natural fabric of
the world when, in fact, it is an artificial creation. 129 Thomas Flynn
describes this as the "inertial sedimentation" of prior group practices. 130
These practices become so routinely adopted that we come to take them as
given. Yet the apparent givenness of culture does not entail the actual
tyranny of culture over its adherents. The causal relationship should be at
least reciprocal, if not reversed altogether. 131 In the case of slavery, then,
some abolitionists may accurately be credited with the culture that
promoted it, for "[t]hose who participate in creating the banality of evil
bear a portion of the guilt for the accidental offender whose actions
bespeak the mentality of the crowd."132  As such, their opposition to
KARL MARX, CAPITAL 864 (Ernest Rhys ed., Eden & Cedar Paul trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1946)
(1930) ("Inasmuch as I conceive the development of the economic structure of society to be a natural
process, I should be the last to hold the individual responsible for conditions whose creature he himself
is .... ").
29 Cf Cohen, supra note 90, at 683 (attributing our reification of culture to a knee-jerk reaction
against the radical atomization entailed by social contract theories).
130 Thomas Flynn, Collective Responsibility and Obedience to the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 845, 851
(1984).
13" For a defense of the view that the individual and collective share equiprimordial ontological
status, see Noam J. Zohar, Collective War and Individualistic Ethics: Against the Conscription of
"Self-Defense, " 21 POL. THEORY 606, 616-18 (1993).
132 Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1544. While I agree with Fletcher that individualists who promote
hatred share culpability with those who act on this hatred, I disagree with his conclusion that to
"[r]ecogniz[e] the mitigating effect of the [group's] guilt would mitigate the responsibility of the
offender .... " Id. at 1539. If our argument above about the role of individuals in maintaining and
transmitting their culture is right, then we may say that the criminal helps to create the climate of moral
degeneracy that allegedly impairs her second-order sensibilities because she instantiates her degenerate
values through her criminal activity. Of course, she may have inherited these values from those who
came before her and whose example she followed. Nonetheless, we would have to adopt a very cynical
view of the capacity for critical reflection were we to infer from the fact of this inheritance that the
individual was thus unable to assess these values. Fletcher's account thus begs a whole host of
questions about individuals' cognitive and volitional abilities.
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slavery itself is no embarrassment to the claim that the nation as a whole
ought to be held responsible for that institution.
Moreover, even if many abolitionists deplored not just slavery but any
state of affairs in which Blacks did not enjoy full equality with Whites, it
would still be correct to assign responsibility for slavery to the nation as a
whole. Indeed, the lessons of Part III mandate this result: during the time
that they were citizens, even the most fully egalitarian abolitionist shared
with her slave-supporting fellows responsibility for the nation's existence
and its apparent agency. In this way, every one of them was responsible
for the nation's actions. Since, as we saw, participation in slavery was
among these actions, citizens living during the time of slavery may
legitimately be held responsible for it. It is for this reason that Lincoln
could accurately proclaim that "[God gave] to both North and South this
terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came. '3
D. Contemporary Citizens and the Duty of Repair134
The theory of group ontology advanced above aims to show that the
nation, qua agent, can exist only through the intentional acts of individuals
who adopt procedures for acting in its name and agree to extend the nation
through time. Contemporary citizens of the United States are thus
responsible for the nation's continued existence and moral agency. Yet the
nation that contemporary citizens have decided to extend harbors a history
that has dark, as well as glorious, phases. Moreover, this history is not
unencumbered. It bequeaths a set of obligations on those who would adopt
it as their collective past. Contemporary citizens incur the nation's debts,
including its debt for slavery, then, because they extend the nation itself. It
is thus entirely appropriate to hold contemporary citizens liable for making
repair. Indeed, in this sense the responsibility of contemporary citizens
Even if Fletcher were right, however, that individuals who live in a culture of evil lack the capacity
to revise their vicious intentions, his conclusion that the guilt of these individuals ought to be mitigated
would still be unwarranted. Of course, we might want to temper the punishments we would otherwise
inflict on these individuals. Yet to argue that their guilt itself is in some way diminished is to suggest
that their actions are more justified than these would be if undertaken with full knowledge of the good
and expansive freedom of the will. The quality of an action, however, does not turn on the mental or
the volitional state of the actor performing it. Whatever we think of Fletcher's argument for collective
responsibility for the content of one's culture, then, we ought not to draw from it the implication about
guilt mitigation that Fletcher himself draws.
133 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in LOis J. EINHORN, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN THE ORATOR: PENETRATING THE LINCOLN LEGEND 179, 180 (1992).
134 For an overview of the conceptual terrain in intergenerational ethics, as well as the
philosophical tools and theories available to think about such issues, see generally Lawrence B. Solum,
To Our Children's Children: The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163
(2001).
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corresponds, appropriately, with the African notion of "ubuntu" - the
notion that "no one can be healthy when the community is sick.,
135
Yet, while a decision to be a part of this country is sufficient to ground
an obligation to make repair, it is not yet sufficient to make reparations a
reality. Again, the debt that we incur is a debt for slavery but, to echo the
opponent of reparations, the slaves are long dead. As such, there are no
legitimate living claimants of slavery reparations. What is needed, then, is
a harm that is distinct from but related to slavery, so that the ground of
citizens' obligations can coincide with the basis for the would-be
recipients' entitlements. In the next Part, I identify a harm in which
contemporary citizens have engaged, and of which contemporary Blacks
have been the victims, and stake the case for reparations there.
V. REPAIRING FAILURES OF REPAIR
"[N]eglecting or expunging the historical record is a way of
undermining and insulting individuals as well.,
136
Until now, we have presumed that slavery engendered a compensable
harm and have focused on the question of who should bear the duty of
redressing this harm. Yet just what is the nature of this harm such that it
reaches into the present and provides a legitimate claim to individuals who
have never known the shackles or misery of slavery, or even those of their
ancestors who did? In this Part, I critique the theories of harm that others
have marshaled and advance an alternative to them. I conclude that it is
not slavery itself that grounds the legitimate claim of contemporary Blacks
but instead the expressive harm of the nation's continued failure to offer
repair that does so.
Before turning to specific accounts of the harm for which reparations
are allegedly owed, however, it will be useful to confront a general
objection to Black reparations according to which no account of the harm
suffered by the descendants of slaves could entitle them to redress. On this
objection, which is a version of Derek Parfit's non-identity problem, 37
135 Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano, & Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, American Justice on
Trial-Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 1269, 1335 (2003).
136 Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historical Injustice, 103 ETHICs 4, 6 (1992); cf Maria Grahn-
Farley, The Master Norm: On the Question of Redressing Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1215, 1219
(2004) ("When racism is eradicated, the memory of slavery will have lost its value in the present.").
137 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-61,366-79 (1984).
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descendants of slavery may not bewail slavery or the disadvantages it
created because they would not have existed had slavery not occurred.
13 8
The objection hinges on three premises: first, and uncontroversially, one's
identity is fixed both by the identities of one's parents and the point in time
when they procreated. Different parents would obviously possess different
genetic material and so yield a different child; the same parents who
procreated at a different time would have a genetically different
combination of sperm and egg fuse, and so would still produce a different
child. The second premise is also unproblematic: slavery led to meetings
among partners that likely would not have occurred otherwise, and it led to
procreative occasions that almost certainly would not have occurred
otherwise. From the first two premises, then, we may conclude that the
particular children who were born to slaves owe their existences to slavery.
Correspondingly, the particular descendants of these children also would
not have existed but for slavery.
The third premise is more problematic: one may claim to have been
wronged in the actual world only if there is a relevantly similar world in
which one exists and where the unjust act did not occur. Arguably, then, if
the unjust act was the cause of one's existence, then one has no ground for
complaint against this act, because there is no other possible world in
which it is the case both that one exists, and that the unjust act did not
occur. I shall argue that this premise is false, but the argument depends on
the nature of the claim pressed by the descendants of slavery. Some
reparationists ground their claims to repair first and foremost in the
compensation that the slaves themselves ought to have received, which
descendants of these slaves would arguably have inherited. 139 Other
reparationists trace the miserable conditions facing many Blacks today to
slavery, and argue for repair as a means of redressing this misery. 4° In
138 Stephen Kershnar, The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations, 8 LEGAL THEORY 243 (2002).
139 See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 152 (1964); Molefi Kete Asante,
The African American Warrant for Reparations: The Crime of European Enslavement of Africans and
Its Consequences, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 104, at 3, 10-11 (citing forced labor, sexual
abuse, loss of innocence, and torture as among the grounds for reparation); Gary Washburn, Daley,
Council Join in Slavery Apology, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 2000, at NI (reporting a 46-1 vote in favor of a
Chicago resolution urging Congress to consider the question of paying reparations to contemporary
African Americans for the suffering of slaves).
140 See, e.g., BITTKER, supra note 99, at 12-29 (locating the ground for repair in segregation and
Jim Crow); Conference: Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45
AM. U. L. REv. 567, 672 (1996) [hereinafter Conference: Race, Law and Justice] (grounding repair in
the disadvantage Blackness has conferred). Cf Angela Davis, Keynote Address at Conference: Race,
Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma (Sept. 21, 1995), in 45 AM. U. L.
REv. 567, 636-45 (1996) (defending affirmative action by appeal to the cumulative disadvantage that
Blacks have suffered).
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what follows, I take up each set of claims separately. I argue that each can
overcome the non-identity objection, but is plagued with other difficulties
that are not as easily defeated. I end with a defense of a novel brand of
contemporary harm, in which repair is owed not for deprivations that
slavery itself produced, but instead for those resulting from the insult
unleashed by the nation's continued failure to offer repair.
A. Inheritance-Based Claims for Repair
Recall that, according to the non-identity problem, an individual who
owes her existence to a set of circumstances may not object to these
circumstances since, without them, she would not have existed at all. The
problem with this premise is that it ignores the fact that some injustices are
not identity-dependent. Inheritance-based claims, in particular, do not
depend for their legitimacy on the particular identity of the claimant.
While it may be true that the particular child who happened to issue from
two slaves would not have been born had slavery not occurred, her claim to
the reparations payments owed her parents holds regardless of who she
happens to be, for any child born to these parents would have had a claim
to this compensation. As such, this particular child's identity is irrelevant
to assessing the legitimacy of her claim. For the same reason, the non-
identity problem poses no real obstacle to the claims of the less proximate
descendants of slaves, even though it is true that they too would not have
existed but for slavery.1
41
Of course, that inheritance-based claims survive the non-identity
objection does not entail that they cannot otherwise be impugned. To raise
an inheritance-based claim, slave descendants would first need to establish
the nature of the claim their slave ancestors could have brought, and then
argue that they were the legitimate heirs of the right to make good on this
claim. There are two common candidates for the nature of the claim that
slaves could have brought - a claim to compensate them for the harm and
abuses involved in enslavement, 142 and a claim to compensate them for
their labor.
43
141 Using a group-based conception of harm, e.g., Fiss, supra note 83, one can arrive at a different
reply to the non-identity objection in the case of reparations: Where a victim was victimized because
of her group, all members of the group should be compensated. Since any child bom to two African
Americans will be African American, the child's claim to compensation as a group member does not
turn on his or her particular identity. Of course, as the race-based harm recedes into the past, newborn
Blacks will have a decreasingly compelling claim for restitution, since the expressive significance of
the harm likely dissipates with time.
142 E.g., Asante, supra note 139, at 10-11 (citing forced labor, sexual abuse, loss of innocence, and
torture as among the grounds for reparation); see, e.g., Washburn, supra note 139 (reporting a 46-1 vote
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Assuming that the freed slaves would have been entitled to sue either
for the abuses they suffered or labor they furnished, would their
descendants have a right to make good on these outstanding claims?
Descendants could claim this right only if they could establish that they
were deprived of a share of their inheritance because their slave ancestors
never received their dues. 144 Yet the deprivation likely cannot be
established. Even if contemporary Blacks could identify their slave
ancestors, and it is not clear that they could, 145 it would be near impossible
to determine what share of the owed compensation would have trickled
down to these descendants. Members of the intervening generations might
have spent all of the compensation money, in which case these descendants
would be no worse off in the actual world where their slave ancestors were
never compensated than they would have been in a world where this
compensation had been paid. 146 Indeed, according to one study, the
disadvantage resulting from the failure to compensate the slaves for their
labor seems to have disappeared within two generations from the time of
in favor of a Chicago resolution urging Congress to consider the question of paying reparations to
contemporary African Americans for the suffering of slaves).
143 E.g., KING, supra note 139, at 138 (tracing African Americans' plight, and thus the justification
for reparations, to "the robberies inherent in the institution of slavery"). Boris Bittker rejects any
ground for reparations that restricts the historical lens to slavery since this restricted view invites
objections based on the failure of identity between contemporary Blacks and slaves, and contemporary
Whites and slave-owners. BITTKER, supra note 99, at 9. Indeed, Bayard Rustin rejected the idea of
reparations on just this ground: "'If my great-grandfather picked cotton for 50 years, then he may
deserve some money, but he's dead and nobody owes me anything."' Id at 10 n.10.
14 It is worth noting that, where claimants seek something other than compensation, the United
States has been willing to take reconciliatory measures even without proof that the descendants of
victims of historical injustices had suffered financially because of the harm to their forbears. For
example, the U.S. apologized to native Hawaiians in 1993 for the annexation of their ancestors' lands
in 1897, Pub. L. 103-150, 103d Cong., 107 Stat. 1510 (1993), and in 1997, the U.S. agreed to
investigate the land claims of contemporary Mexican-Americans whose ancestors' land titles were
ignored under an 1848 treaty. See generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 696-98 (presenting a
whole host of reparations programs in table form).
145 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 29. Anthony Appiah has made the intriguing claim that there are
more White descendants of slaves than there are Black ones, suggesting that color, at least, will not be a
reliable guide. Anthony Appiah, Remarks at the Yale, New Haven and American Slavery Conference:
The Moral Claims of the Past: Justice Across Time (Sept. 28, 2002); cf BITrKER, supra note 99, at 71-
104 (1973) (providing a thorough and compelling account of the problems involved in identifying
claimants in a reparations program aimed at rectifying racial discrimination resulting from segregation
and Jim Crow). But see Ghannam, supra note 10, at 39 (reporting that recent research has already
identified which slave fortunes were made by which Louisiana families, and which slaves were owned
by these families).
146 THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 110-12; see also BIrrfKER, supra note 99, at 28.
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abolition. 147 So the failure to compensate the ex-slaves seems to have had
no direct economic effect on contemporary Blacks. 
148
More generally, even if contemporary Blacks could make out a
legitimate inheritance-based claim for repair, it is not clear that
reparationists would be wise to stake their case on this ground. Laws of
bequest carry with them their own concerns about equity as they tend to
exacerbate existing income disparities. 49 A program that seeks to restore
racial equality should, if possible, avoid reliance upon mechanisms that
conduce to economic inequality.' 50
Of course, not all bequests are material and those that are not need not
(and generally do not) upset socioeconomic gradients. Thus, those who
demand reparations as recompense for the lost African heritage do not
implicate equity-based concerns. 151 The strategy is promising, for the
147 Sacerdote, supra note 11.
148 This is not to suggest that Blacks do not occupy a position of disadvantage in this country. See,
e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE CRIME AND THE LAW (1997); ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS (1997); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996); Van B. Luong,
Political Interest Convergence: African American Reparations and the Image of American
Democracy, 25 U. RAW. L. REV. 253, 253 (2002) (reporting that, in 1999, the net worth of the average
African American family was $7,000 compared with $84,400 for the average White American family);
Ransford W. Palmer, Reparations and the Black- White Income Gap, 6 How. SCROLL SOC. JUST. L.
REV. 71, 71-73 (2003) (presenting statistics revealing gross wealth disparities between Blacks and
Whites over the age of 55); Lancaster, supra note 104, at 191 (citing disparities in college attendance
between Whites and Blacks).
149 See, e.g., Michael Hout, Houses Divided. A Study of One of the Most Troubling Gaps Between
White and Black America, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2004, at BW3 (reviewing THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE
HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004)). In
the context of the debate about returning aboriginal lands, Jeremy Waldron has argued that what
counted as an unjust seizure at the time that it occurred "may be transformed, so far as its ongoing
effect is concerned, into a just situation if circumstances change in the meantime." Waldron, supra
note 48, at 205, 221. The circumstances Waldron has in mind include population growth and/or
resource scarcity, either of which could entail that the Aboriginals in question were no longer entitled
to the expropriated lands. Id. at 217-22. Christopher Kutz has made a similar argument in the context
of reappropriation of land in Eastern Europe. Kutz, supra note 25, at 296-302; see also Samuel T.
Morison, Prescriptive Justice and the Weight of History, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1153 (2005).
50 THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 110. Thompson does make an exception for what she calls
"lifetime-transcending interests," id. at 114-22, which motivate the projects to which one devotes his
life even while they often cannot be completed within one lifespan. Thus, the individual who begins a
newspaper, say, ought to be allowed to bequeath it to her children, since they have likely been invested
with a valuation of the newspaper that their bestowing parent would share. These children are thus
likely to pursue their parents' project with greater zeal than would the stranger who would receive the
newspaper through some redistribution program were all bequests to be forbidden.
151 See ROBINSON, supra note 30; see also Jewel Crawford, Wade W. Nobles & Joy DeGruy Leary,
Reparations and Health Care for African Americans: Repairing the Damage from the Legacy of
Slavery, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 104, at 251, 253 (describing the flourishing African
culture that existed before the slave trade); Yaa Asantewa Nzingha, Reparations + Education = The
Pass to Freedom, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 104, at 299, 303-305 (condemning American
curricula for their celebration of white slave owners like Washington and Jefferson).
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cultural loss is one of the worst devastations wrought by slavery. As
Randall Robinson contends, while other human rights crimes have claimed
millions of lives, only slavery
has hulled empty a whole race of people with inter-
generational efficiency. Every artifact of the victims'
past cultures, every custom, every ritual, every god,
every language... wrenched from them and ground into
a sharp choking dust. It is a human rights crime without
parallel in the modem world. For it produces its victims
ad infinitum, long after the active stage of the crime has
ended."52
There is no doubt that we all have much to regret about the loss to the
world of these cultural treasures. It is not yet clear, however, that this loss
is compensable. Indeed, here, a different and more pernicious sort of non-
identity objection arises. We were able to escape the standard objection
earlier by pointing to a loss that a slave descendant would suffer no matter
who he happened to be. Whatever other problems attach to inheritance-
based claims, it is at least coherent for a descendant to claim, "I was
unjustly deprived of this bequest." This claim is just elliptical for the
statement, "the child of my mother/father was unjustly deprived of his
bequest," where the statement is true for whatever child results. But the
claim, "I was unjustly deprived of my culture" (where "my culture" is
supposed to refer to the African culture of the speaker's forbears) is
incoherent because the "I" is constituted by the culture in which it
develops. 53 The claimant would not be who he is in the world where the
culture of his ancestors had been preserved and bestowed upon him.
Perhaps the meaningftlness of the claim could be rescued if Robinson's
charge that African Americans were no more than empty hulls were true -
in that case, African Americans would not be individual selves at all and so
there would not be a concern about a failure of reference between their
current beings and the individuals who would have resulted had the
cultural loss not occurred. But Robinson's charge is false - African
Americans grow up with a culture at least as robust as that of their African
forbears (although, in the wake of white oppression, that culture may be
152 ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 216.
153 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 128, at 179.
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less glorious). 154 The culture that perished is no more the culture of Black
Americans than it is the culture of White Americans. However tragic its
loss, then, this culture cannot ground a program of Black reparations.
To sum up, reparationists who stake their claims on inheritance-based
grounds will have to establish appropriate lineages, contend with unwieldy
counterfactuals about how much money would have trickled down to the
slave descendants had the slaves been paid, defend rights to bequest, and
articulate a harm that claimants actually suffer. At this point, the
difficulties facing inheritance-based claims appear too daunting to warrant
further pursuit.
B. Reparations and Contemporary Harms
Faced with the challenges of making out a convincing inheritance-based
claim for reparations, some reparationists focus instead on the legacy of
slavery for race relations today. These theorists ground a claim for redress
in the disadvantages that flow not from slavery itself, but instead from the
more recent discriminatory measures that slavery enabled.155 Focusing on
the stigmatizing vestiges of slavery, rather than slavery itself, has the
advantage of circumventing worries about identifying the actual
descendants of slaves or slave owners. I will argue that there are two
problems with this justification for reparations, though. First, it too is
susceptible to the non-identity problem, albeit not insuperably. Second,
the harms to which this justification points are in fact ancillary to the true
harm for which repair is owed. I end with a description of this harm.
To begin with the non-identity problem, we should note that the defense
marshaled against it in the last section is unavailing here. There, we
argued that the non-identity problem did not apply because the harms for
which compensation was sought were not identity-dependent: any child
born to slaves was deprived of his rightful inheritance, and so his precise
identity did not impugn the legitimacy of his claim. Here, however, the
claimant contends that she is owed for harms that she herself actually
suffers. Identity is thus clearly at issue, and so we will have to address the
non-identity problem head-on.
154 See, e.g., JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA
(2000) (arguing, inter alia, that African American culture is infected with a cult of victimology,
separatism, and anti-intellectualism). But see, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Losing the (Understanding of the
Importance O) Race: Evaluating the Significance of Race and the Utility of Reparations, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 911 (2002) (contesting McWhorter's social science data, and arguing that discrepancies in income
and success between Blacks and Whites can be accounted for by acts of past discrimination, rather than
African American culture).
'55 See generally supra note 140.
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Recall that the problem aims to foreclose complaints about the
circumstances of an individual's creation where she would not have been
born had these circumstances been otherwise. The proponent of the non-
identity objection is right to insist that it would be non-sensical for the
resulting child to claim, "You harmed me when you created those
circumstances," since "me" had no referent at the time that the
circumstances were produced. But where the consequences of an act
linger, such that they continue to harm our claimant at a time after her
birth, then she ought to be entitled to repair for these lingering effects. To
see this, consider the case of a child who is born to slaves who met as a
result of slavery, but who conceive only after they have been emancipated.
Assume further that the mother and father would not have met were they
not slaves, so that the resulting child owes his existence to slavery. If the
first few years of this child's life are spent in misery because his parents
are without adequate means to provide for him, are we compelled to say,
along with the proponent of the non-identity objection, that he may not
claim redress for this misery? If we believe that a slaveholder is
accountable not only for his actions at the time that they occur, but also for
at least the proximate consequences of these actions, then we need not
exclude compensation for the child from the debts that this slaveholder
owes.
Of course, sometimes the non-identity objection is construed not as a
conceptual thesis, where claims are dismissed because no victim exists at
the time when a harm is alleged to have occurred, but instead as an
economic thesis, where claims are dismissed because the great good that
the alleged victim receives in having been born far exceeds whatever
disadvantages flow from the circumstances of her creation.' 56 Leo Katz,
for example, has argued that the "blessings of living in the United
States,"1 57 which would not have accrued to slave descendants in the
absence of slavery, might be sufficient to outweigh the inheritance of
which these descendants were deprived.1 58 Here, what is claimed is that
the slave descendants, whoever they are, might in fact be better off for
slavery, and hence ineligible for repair on compensatory grounds.
156 Seana Shiffrin, for example, seems to understand the non-identity problem in this way. "[T]he
so-called non-identity problem trades on an implausible, economically-influenced caricature of what
constitutes a harm or a wrong. On this view, a claim that one has been harmed or wronged is undercut
by a demonstration that the overall position of the person or the overall outcome of the episode in
question is beneficial .... Shiffrin, supra note 32, at 2.
157 Leo Katz, What To Compensate: Some Surprisingly Unappreciated Reasons Why the Problem
Is So Hard, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1345, 1364 (2003).
151 Id. at 1364-65.
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Even if life in America were a blessing for all African Americans (and
we have already seen reasons to doubt that this is so), 59 the objection
would remain utterly perverse. For example, reduced to its most absurd,
the objection would entail that former slave-owners could do whatever
they wanted to the child in our hypothetical so long as the child's later
years were filled with enough happiness to make his life, on balance, a life
worth living. 60  Indeed, a comparison with the situation of American
Holocaust survivors, many of whom enjoy greater success, on average,
than their American Jewish contemporaries who were not victimized by
the Holocaust, is instructive here.161 It seems plain that the survivors'
relative success presumably did not diminish the warrant for repair. After
all, reparations were owed not for the economic deprivation that the
Holocaust entailed but for the horrible abuses that Jews, gypsies and
homosexuals suffered. 162 As such, the subsequent success of the survivors
was irrelevant to the legitimacy of their claims. Similarly, need did not
factor into considerations about whether Japanese Americans interned
during World War II were owed compensation. 163  But neither can the
suffering of Blacks be reduced to economic deprivation. I go on to argue
that this deprivation is concomitant with and results from a dignitary harm,
and that it is this harm that furnishes the ground for repair. 64 Thus, no
matter the gains in standard of living that the United States provides over
159 See supra note 148. But see Raymond A. Winbush, Interview with Chester and Timothy
Hurdle, Barbara Ratliff, and Ina Hurdle-McGee, October 29, 2002, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra
note 104, at 315, 318 (interviewing children of freed slaves, one of whom expressed gratitude for
slavery since it allowed her to be born in America).
160 See id. at 2-3.
161 Daniel Goleman, Holocaust Survivors Had Skills To Prosper, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992, at C1
(citing research conducted in the early '90s which revealed that "though the [Holocaust] survivors had,
on average, less education, their careers were more successful and their incomes greater" than other
American Jews of the same generation).
162 That the Holocaust reparations package involved more than just restitution of property can be
seen from provisions that make the package conditional on the recipients' relinquishment of any further
claims against Germany and Switzerland, and that have these countries indemnify the financial
institutions that are the named payers. If the banks were merely returning stolen property, then there
would be no reason to think that this return foreclosed claims against countries that colluded with
Hitler. See generally STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2003); cf Elizabeth Tyler Bates, Contemplating
Lawsuits for the Recovery of Slave Property: The Case of Slave Art, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1109 (using the
Holocaust restitution cases as a justificatory source for claims that would seek compensation for crafts
and works of art executed by slaves).
163 A lawyer involved in the Japanese reparations campaign tells the story of William Hohri, one of
the leading activists for Japanese reparations, who intended to use his compensation money to purchase
a Jaguar. The final amount of compensation, however, was so small that Hohri was only able to afford
a Nissan, the license plate for which read "REDRESS." Conference: Race, Law and Justice, supra
note 140, at 652-53.
'6' See infra Part V.B.
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the African countries of the slaves, these gains cannot and do not undercut
the expressive injury that Blacks suffer, and for which they are owed
repair.
So much, then, for the non-identity problem. Turning now to the merits
of reparations claims that ground themselves in contemporary harms, we
can recognize two varieties of such claims. The first, advanced by Boris
Bittker, grounds repair in the official sources of racial discrimination that
produced Jim Crow, segregation, anti-miscegenation laws and so on.'65 As
he writes, "[t]he status of American blacks today stems unmistakably from
the years when segregation enjoyed the nihil obstat of Plessy v. Ferguson,
and no one ... can doubt that the life of blacks in America will bear for
decades the scars of a century of discrimination.'
'16
The second sort of claim adopts a more metaphoric approach to the
harm, locating it in the privilege that attaches to being white-skinned, or
the disadvantage that flows from being brown-skinned, both of which are
traced to slavery. 167 Ralph Ellison captured the operation of this white skin
privilege when he wrote that
[m]any whites could look at the social position of blacks
and feel that color formed an easy and reliable gauge for
determining to what extent one was or was not
American. Perhaps that is why one of the first epithets
that many European immigrants learned when they got
165 See BITTKER, supra note 99, at 12-29.
6Id. at 19.
167 See, e.g., Conference: Race, Law and Justice, supra note 140, at 672 ("[B]ecause of racism,
there is a white-skin privilege, so that any white person walking down the street is going to be treated
differently than any black person walking down the street."); Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky Magic:
Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 125 (1999) (describing
the reaction of a wealthy Jamaican emigrant to United States: "[h]e discovered once he reached the
United States that the assured social status to which he had become accustomed was no more, and that
he was subject to the same racial discrimination that any other Black person was.").
Experiments have bome out this White skin privilege: Whites and Blacks posing as job, loan or
housing candidates have arrived at interviews with identical sets of credentials. Even for blue-collar
jobs, Black candidates were 20-25% less likely to advance in the hiring process. Black applicants also
faced discrimination in contacts with realtors and were more likely to be turned down for loans.
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative
African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 706 (1999); cf Anita Indira Anand, Visible
Minorities in The Multi-Racial State: When Are Preferential Policies Justifiable?, 21 DALHOUSIE L.J.
92, 127 (1998) ("White males, by virtue of their colour and gender, benefit from a social atmosphere in
which that is the best thing to be.").
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off the boat was the term 'nigger' - it made them feel
instantly American.1
68
Though Bittker and Ellison offer compelling and evocative statements
about race relations, their accounts of harm share the time-limiting feature
that is the Achilles' heel of more traditional arguments in favor of slavery
reparations. As the era of Jim Crow, segregation and overt private
discrimination recedes in time, citizens will again be able to protest that
they never participated in or endorsed any of these practices, and most
Blacks are too young to have suffered from them anyway. Yet, even as
these citizens issue their protestations, the disadvantage accruing to Blacks
will remain.169 So, neither Bittker nor Ellison's account of harm makes the
case for Black reparations compelling.
Yet there is a way to preserve the timeliness of calls for repair. Rather
than viewing Jim Crow, segregation, de facto discrimination, and the
disadvantage that arises from Blackness as the causes of a harm for which
repair is owed, we should construe these phenomena as the products of a
culture that has denied Black claims to repair and thereby communicated
that to be Black is to be inferior. The failure to make repair thus relates
back to slavery, but persists through to the present and links that ancient
injustice to the more modern discriminatory practices that Bittker and
Ellison decry, sweeping them all up into a harm in which we have
participated, along with all members of the nation since the time of
Reconstruction.
The transgression that is the ongoing failure to make repair thus adopts
a cyclical pattern: 170 at the close of the Civil War, the nation owed
reparations to the freed slaves since the nation as a whole participated in
slavery, as we saw in Part IV. The failure of the nation to offer reparations
to the freed slaves blighted their emancipation and demeaned the abuses
they had suffered. This failure effectively signified that Blacks did not
168 Ralph Ellison, What America Would Be Like Without Blacks, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF
RALPH ELLISON, 577, 582-83 (John F. Callahan ed., 1995); see also Does America Owe a Debt to the
Descendants of Its Slaves?, supra note 104, at 91 (citing comedian Chris Rock, who famously said to
his white interlocutor, "Despite all the changes in society, you wouldn't switch places with me, a black
man. And I'm rich!").
169 See supra note 148.
170 Cf Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 708-09. Forde-Mazrui identifies a recurring harm that he
thinks grounds a duty to repair. He locates this harm in the material effects for the present generation
of the failure to redress past discrimination. The account I elaborate here, however, is rooted in an
expressive harm, and the act giving rise to this harm-viz., our willful neglect of the legitimate cries of
Blacks for repair-is not an act of past discrimination but instead an insult that persists to this day.
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merit equal justice. Moreover, it entailed that the poverty of the newly
freed people would persist until they could overcome it through their own
financial gains, an eventuality unlikely to occur soon after Emancipation,
given the freed people's relative lack of marketable skills. In this way, the
initial failure to make repair yielded both material and expressive harms -
it sustained an unjustly created disadvantage and it perpetuated an
unfounded conception of Blacks as morally unworthy.
These harms were themselves compensable, and their legitimate
claimants included not only the newly freed slaves but also their children,
who would have suffered from both harms too. Failure to redress the
children of slaves constituted an offense against them and their children
(i.e., the freed slaves' grandchildren) for the same reasons. 171 The
transgression has been repeated in every generation through to the present
one. It should be clear, then, that neither state-sanctioned discrimination
nor a white skin privilege is an independent harm for which repair is owed;
both are the necessary corollaries of a regime in which to be Black is to
have one's moral claims ignored or denied.
72
Like the culture that practices it, 173 the omission is omnipresent and
hence invisible to its practitioners. Yet this omission is likely far more
salient to those whom it deprives. Moreover, the deprivation is likely felt
by all Blacks living in America today. For the decision to deny claims of
repair (and, again, the persistence of this decision should not fool us into
believing that it is not being made all the time) is not formed in
contemplation of a subset of Blacks comprising the slaves' descendants.
Instead, the United States has refused even to begin a process of truth and
reconciliation, 174 and so offends every Black since, for all we know before
this process begins, any Black could be a slave descendant. 75
171 Leo Katz suggests that even if reparations were to have been paid to the slaves or some
generation of their descendants, subsequent generations of slave descendants might nonetheless have
valid claims to repair. Katz, supra note 157, at 1365-66. He premises the suggestion on an analogy to
a rape victim who acquires an inheritable disease from her rapist, and he wonders whether
compensation for the victim and her child, who inherits the disease, would extinguish the claims of
future descendants who also inherit the infection. The analogy is inapt, however, for the harm of
slavery or the nation's subsequent indifference to its debt is not like an infectious disease-sincere and
robust reparations would eradicate the harm once and for all.
172 Cf Matsuda, supra note 36, at 390 (arguing that the fact that there is no cognizable legal claim
that contemporary Blacks can wield in their quest for reparations is not only a sign of their relative
powerlessness but also an injury in itself, because this lacuna "signifies the political non-personhood"
of Blacks).
173 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
17' See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 40, 109th
Cong. (2005), a bill that proposes, inter alia, to "establish a commission to examine the institution of
slavery, subsequent dejure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against African Americans,
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In this way, contemporary Blacks suffer an actual harm for which
contemporary citizens are culpable not just through their symbolic
association with the nation. Instead, in their failure to discharge the debts
for which they are liable, these citizens repeat the transgression that has
been the fate of African Americans since emancipation.1 76 Because this
construction of the harm implicates all contemporary citizens, Blacks will,
on this account, both receive and owe repair. Yet this outcome is what
acknowledgment of Blacks' full membership in the moral community
requires.
In short, slavery provided the initial ground for Black reparations, but
the warrant for redress has been sustained by the nation's continued
neglect of and indifference to the cries of Blacks for justice. For this
reason, the force of their cries does not attenuate as time progresses; if
anything, the cumulative omission only heightens the offense, for it
extends the historic exclusion of Blacks from full membership in the moral
community. Thus, those who plead for absolution on the ground that they
had nothing to do with slavery and so should not be made to pay for it thus
get the issue completely wrong. It is precisely because we did nothing that
we should be made to pay.
VI. CONCLUSION
Existing theories of responsibility fail to establish how an individual
member of a group may legitimately be held responsible for actions the
group undertakes before his or her tenure in it. Individualist accounts
and the impact of these forces on living African Americans." The bill has been introduced, and
defeated, every year since 1989. Compare White, supra note 10 ("Heck, we couldn't even persuade
Bill Clinton, who is practically kin, to apologize for slavery, much less pony up any cash. Is there any
reason to think George W. Bush-let alone a majority in Congress-would be more receptive?"), with
Yamamoto, supra note 4, at 483 (citing President Clinton's apology to indigenous Hawaiians for the
illegal U.S.-aided overthrow of the sovereign nation), and Stuart Eizenstat, Keynote Address (Nov. 1,
2001), in 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 205, 216 (2001) (underlining the significance of the apology issued
by President Rau for Germany's participation in the Holocaust: "I think all of us felt that had that
statement not been made, there would have been a sense of incompleteness to the DM 10 billion
settlement.").
175 Cf Ryan Fortson, Correcting the Harms of Slavery: Collective Liability, The Limited Prospects
for a Class Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of Whites 'Racial Identity,
6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 71, 125 (2004) (arguing that focusing exclusively upon Black slave
descendants, rather than all contemporary Blacks, obscures present day discrimination).
176 Cf Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy Guttman ed., 1994) (arguing that misrecognition-that is, the
failure to recognize the humanity or uniqueness of another-can be a form of contempt and
oppression).
[Vol.XXII: 183
Reconceiving the Case for Reparations
unduly ignore the relationships between individuals' contributions to a
collective product, and inappropriately limit liability to the magnitude of
an individual's direct contribution to a harmful act, rather than the extent
of harm he directly or indirectly caused. Collectivist theories licitly
assume that responsibility presupposes control over the group act, and
hence, when it comes to historical injustices, fail to arrive at responsibility
ascriptions significantly different from those the individualist would
countenance. By turning to an account of collective agency, however, we
can see how each member contributes to the group's apparent moral status,
and how each may thus be held responsible for wrongdoing no matter
when in the group's history the wrongful act occurred.
It is through such an account that we can locate the duty Americans
bear to repair the legacy of slavery, for we are members of the same nation
as those of our forbears who practiced, promoted, or otherwise facilitated
slavery. Slavery was their transgression; the failure to repair it has been
ours. While the debt they bequeathed to us may not have arisen from a
transgression for which any of us is guilty, each of us is guilty for failing to
discharge this debt. We are guilty even if we have never thought about
reparations before - indeed, we would be guilty because we had never
thought about reparations before. We are guilty because together we have
perpetuated a culture that turns its back on its moral obligations, and does
so with special ease when those obligations concern Blacks. We are guilty
because we have refused even to issue an apology, 177 and so we have
communicated that we repudiate the legitimate claims that may be imposed
on us, rather than repudiating our shameful past. We must halt the cycle of
our collective transgression, and compensate those who have been
shackled by our indifference. We must make repair.
177 Indeed, some commentators argue that the true motivation behind the United States' withdrawal
from the 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance was a proposed U.N. declaration proclaiming that slavery was a crime against
humanity. See, e.g., Lorenzo Morris, Symptoms of Withdrawal-The U.N., The U.S., Racism and
Reparations, 6 How. SCROLL SOC. JUST. L. REv. 49, 50-51 (2003); Michelle E. Lyons, Note, World
Conference Against Racism: New Avenues for Slavery Reparations?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1235, 1238 (2002); cf Anne Bayefsky, The U.N. World Conference Against Racism: A Racist Anti-
Racism Conference, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 65, 71 (2002) (citing resistance among European
Union delegates to having to pay reparations for slavery).
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